G.R. No. L-10858; October 20, 1915
PEDRO M. DUARTE, petitioner, vs. WALLER H. DADE, Director of Prisons, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro M. Duarte was tried, over his objection, by the Court of Appeals of the Island of Guam on March 1, 1915. He was convicted of misappropriation of public funds while serving as postmaster at Guam and was sentenced to cadena temporal for fourteen years, eight months, and one day, plus accessory penalties, indemnity to the U.S. Government, and costs. The Governor of Guam later mitigated the prison term to ten years. By agreement between the Governor of Guam and the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, Bilibid Prison in Manila was designated as the place for the execution of the confinement portion of the sentence. Consequently, Duarte was transferred to and confined in Bilibid Prison under the custody of respondent W.H. Dade, the Director of Prisons. Duarte filed an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court of the Philippines, challenging the legality of his detention.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Supreme Court of the Philippines has the authority to inquire into the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of Guam that tried and sentenced Duarte.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals of Guam had legal jurisdiction to try and sentence Duarte.
3. Whether the respondent Director of Prisons is legally authorized to hold Duarte in confinement at Bilibid Prison.

RULING:
1. On the Supreme Court’s Authority to Inquire: The Supreme Court held that it has the authority to examine the jurisdiction of the Guam court. The Court distinguished the situation from U.S. cases where state courts cannot review Federal court judgments, as those are based on a dual system of government within the same territory. Here, Guam and the Philippines are separate governmental entities presiding over distinct territories, both deriving authority from the U.S. Government. Any respect given to Guam’s judicial acts in the Philippines is a matter of comity, not legal compulsion. Under Philippine law (Sections 309 and 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure), a foreign judgment can be impeached for want of jurisdiction. Since the writ of habeas corpus aims to determine the legality of detention, and Duarte’s confinement originates from the Guam judgment, the Court has the right and duty to investigate the committing court’s jurisdiction.

2. On the Jurisdiction of the Guam Court: The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals of Guam had jurisdiction. The Court traced the U.S. acquisition of Guam via the Treaty of Paris and its placement under the U.S. Navy Department by Executive Order. The Secretary of the Navy, acting under presidential authority, issued instructions to the Naval Governor, which included the power to establish courts. The Court found that the Governor of Guam, by virtue of these instructions and the plenary authority vested in him by the President, had the power to create the Court of Appeals and vest it with jurisdiction over cases like Duarte’s. The fact that the court was created by executive order (a letter from the Governor) and not by statute did not invalidate it, as the Governor’s authority in this regard was legislative in character. The Court also rejected the argument that the lack of a right to appeal rendered the trial court without jurisdiction, noting that appellate review is not an inherent right but a matter of statutory grant.

3. On the Authority to Confine in Bilibid Prison: The Supreme Court held that the respondent is authorized to hold Duarte. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court precedent in ex parte Karstendick, the Court ruled that the agreement between the Governors of Guam and the Philippines made Bilibid Prison, for this purpose, a prison of the U.S. Government. The consent of the Philippine government (through its Governor-General) and the absence of objection from the state (or in this case, the Philippine government) to the detention validated the confinement. The petitioner, as the prisoner, could not object to this arrangement so long as the detaining authority (the Philippine government) permitted it.

DISPOSITION: The writ of habeas corpus was DENIED. Petitioner Pedro M. Duarte was remanded to the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons. Costs were taxed against the petitioner.

DISSENTING OPINION (Johnson, J.):
Justice Johnson dissented solely on the third issue. He argued that there was no law authorizing the Philippine government to detain prisoners sentenced by a foreign sovereign (Guam) or authorizing the Governor of Guam to imprison his citizens in a foreign country. He noted that U.S. federal law (Revised Statutes) had specific provisions regulating the imprisonment of prisoners in jails other than those expressly provided for, and no such designation had been made by the U.S. Attorney-General for Bilibid Prison. Therefore, he concluded that Duarte’s imprisonment in Bilibid was illegal.