G.R. No. L-10351, December 24, 1915
FRANK CERF, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUCAS MEDEL, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
Frank Cerf filed a complaint against Lucas Medel for damages. Cerf alleged that on April 1, 1914, while he was lawfully riding his motorcycle on a public highway in Malate, Manila, Medel’s automobile, which was operated as a public vehicle for hire and was under the direction of Medel’s servant, was so negligently driven that it struck and damaged Cerf’s motorcycle. Cerf asserted he exercised due care and that the collision resulted solely from the defendant’s servant’s negligence.

Medel demurred to the complaint on two grounds: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction over his person because the complaint did not allege he was within the court’s jurisdiction, and (2) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because, under the ruling in Johnson vs. David, a master is not liable for the negligent acts of his servant when the vehicle is not used in connection with the master’s business or enterprise.

The Court of First Instance of Manila sustained the demurrer and, upon Cerf’s failure to amend, dismissed the action. Cerf appealed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer based on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
2. Whether the complaint states a sufficient cause of action against the defendant-master for the negligent act of his servant.

RULING:
1. On the Jurisdictional Issue: The Supreme Court held the demurrer on this ground was not sustainable. The court’s jurisdiction was general and not dependent on the defendant’s residence. The failure to allege the defendant’s residence in such a case is not a jurisdictional defect that warrants a demurrer, following Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General.

2. On the Sufficiency of the Cause of Action: The Supreme Court held the demurrer on this ground was also untenable. The complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action.

The Court distinguished the applicable principles under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. A master’s liability for a servant’s acts depends on whether the master is a private individual or the owner/director of an establishment or enterprise. In Johnson vs. David and Chapman vs. Underwood, the defendants were not liable because their vehicles were for private use and not part of any business operation.

However, the complaint in this case specifically alleged that Medel’s automobile was “operated and employed by the defendant as a public vehicle carrying passengers for hire.” This allegation places the case within the scope of Article 1903, which holds owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which they are employed. The case is thus governed by the doctrine in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes and Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co., where a presumption of negligence arises against the business owner, which must be rebutted by proving the diligence of a good father of a family.

Therefore, the complaint’s allegations, if proven, could establish Medel’s liability as the owner of a business enterprise (a public vehicle for hire) for the negligent acts of his servant acting within the scope of employment.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint is REVERSED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings.