G.R. No. L-11262; March 2, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO T. GIMENEZ, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The defendant, Gregorio T. Gimenez, was charged with the crime of bigamy (illegal marriage). Upon arraignment, he initially pleaded “not guilty.” During the trial, after the prosecution presented three witnesses, the proceedings were suspended. Upon reconvening the next day, the defendant’s counsel informed the court that the defendant wished to withdraw his plea of “not guilty” and substitute it with a plea of “guilty.” The court granted the request and, based solely on this plea entered by counsel, immediately rendered a judgment convicting the defendant and sentencing him to six years and one day of prision mayor, with accessory penalties. The defendant appealed the judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether a conviction based on a plea of guilty entered solely by the defendant’s counsel, for a felony charge, is valid.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial.

The Court held that under the procedural law then in force (General Orders No. 58), a clear distinction existed between misdemeanors and felonies regarding pleas. For felonies, Section 25 expressly provided that “[a] plea of guilty can be put in only by the defendant himself in open court.” The language “only by the defendant himself” is restrictive and absolute; it prohibits any other person, including counsel, from entering such a plea on behalf of the accused in a felony case. Consequently, the plea of guilty entered by the defendant’s counsel was a nullity, and no valid conviction could rest upon it.

The Court further addressed the question of whether a new trial would place the defendant in double jeopardy. It ruled that it would not. By appealing the judgment and successfully having it annulled due to a fatal error committed at his own instance (through his counsel’s invalid plea), the defendant was deemed to have waived his constitutional protection against double jeopardy for the purpose of obtaining a new trial. Following the doctrine established in Trono v. United States, when an accused secures the reversal of a conviction at his own request, he must “take the burden with the benefit” and may be retried on the same charge. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance for a new trial.