G.R. No. L-12817, October 25, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EMILIO BAYONA VITOG, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
On June 9, 1916, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 14134) charging Emilio Bayona Vitog and three others with the crime of theft. It was alleged that on or about May 12, 1916, they conspired to steal and carry away 400 sacks of sugar belonging to the Pacific Commercial Co. On October 11, 1916, the court acquitted Bayona Vitog of theft, but the judgment was entered “without prejudice to the right of the fiscal to proceed against said defendant for any offense, of which said Emilio Bayona may be considered guilty.”

Subsequently, on December 11, 1916, a new information was filed (Case No. 14731) charging Bayona Vitog alone with the crime of estafa. It alleged that on or about the same date, May 12, 1916, he received 2,300 sacks of sugar from the Pacific Commercial Co. under an obligation to transport and deliver them, but he appropriated 400 sacks to himself. Bayona Vitog interposed a plea of autrefois acquit (double jeopardy). The trial judge sustained this plea and dismissed the case. The Government appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether the subsequent prosecution for estafa, based on substantially the same facts as the prior prosecution for theft from which the accused was acquitted, places the accused twice in jeopardy for the same offense, in violation of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the lower court and remanded the case for trial. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy prohibits a second jeopardy for the same offense, not for the same act. The test is whether the evidence required to support a conviction under the first information (theft) would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction under the second information (estafa). Here, the essential elements of theft and estafa are different. Theft involves the unlawful taking of property belonging to another. Estafa (under the allegations) involves the misappropriation or conversion of property lawfully received by the accused. The basic act alleged in the first case was the unlawful acquisition of the sugar (theft). The basic act alleged in the second case was the failure to deliver sugar lawfully received (estafa). Therefore, an acquittal for theft does not bar a prosecution for estafa arising from the same transaction, as each crime requires proof of a fact not required by the other. The accused was not placed in jeopardy for the crime of estafa during the first trial for theft.

Motion for Reconsideration: The Court denied the motion, distinguishing this case from U.S. vs. Regala (28 Phil. 57). In Regala, the same acts alleged constituted only one offense (estafa), and the second charge (malversation) had no foundation. Here, the acts alleged could support two distinct offenses, and the acquittal under the first (theft) did not preclude a trial under the second (estafa) because they are not the “same offense.”

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