GR L 15988; (January, 1920) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-15988; January 12, 1920
JUAN NEPOMUCENO, petitioner, vs. PRIMITIVO SAN AGUSTIN, auxiliary judge of first instance, Second Group of Judicial Districts, ELIGIO GATMAITAN, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
On September 23, 1919, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered a judgment in a cadastral survey action. Petitioner Juan Nepomuceno received notice of the decision on October 6, 1919. On October 7, 1919, he filed a motion for a new trial and requested it be set for hearing on October 13, 1919. The motion remained undecided, and on October 20, 1919, he again requested a hearing for October 28, 1919. The respondent judge instead set the hearing for November 8, 1919, without notice to the petitioner. On November 7, 1919, while the motion for a new trial was still pending, the petitioner presented a bill of exceptions, reserving the right to amend it to include the court’s eventual order on the motion. On November 10, 1919, the respondent judge denied the motion for a new trial and refused to sign and certify the bill of exceptions, ruling that it was filed out of timebeyond the 30-day period from notice of the decision under Section 26 of Act No. 2347.
ISSUE:
Whether the bill of exceptions was filed within the reglementary period, considering the pendency of the motion for a new trial.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus, compelling the respondent judge to sign and certify the bill of exceptions. The Court held that under Section 26 of Act No. 2347, the 30-day period to file a bill of exceptions in land registration cases runs from notice of the decision, but the time during which the court is considering a motion for a new trial is excluded from the computation. Here, notice of the decision was received on October 6, 1919, and the motion for a new trial was filed on October 7, 1919before any part of the 30-day period had elapsed. The motion was denied on November 10, 1919, and the bill of exceptions was filed on November 7, 1919, while the motion was still pending. Thus, no part of the 30-day period had run, and the bill of exceptions was timely filed. The Court cited consistent jurisprudence, including Layda vs. Legazpi (39 Phil. 83), establishing that the period is tolled during the pendency of a motion for a new trial. Costs were awarded against the respondents.