G.R. No. 2122
September 13, 1905

FACTS:
Pedro T. Acosta filed a complaint against David Flor for usurpation of the office of Municipal President of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Acosta alleged that in the municipal elections held on December 1, 1903, he was elected by a majority of 100 votes, but that Flor had unlawfully taken and held the office. During the trial, Acosta presented witnesses testifying to alleged illegalities in the election. However, no witness testified, nor was any evidence presented, to prove Acosta’s central allegation that he had obtained a majority of votes and was therefore entitled to the office. Acosta himself admitted his failure to establish his right to the office. Upon motion of the defendant, and before the defense presented its evidence, the trial court dismissed the case and acquitted Flor, ruling that Acosta could not maintain the action because he failed to prove his right to the office. Acosta appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether a private individual who fails to prove his own right to a public office may maintain an action (quo warranto) for the exclusion of another person from that office based on alleged illegalities in the election.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

The Court held that the right to bring an action for usurpation of a public office (quo warranto) is specifically governed by Sections 197 to 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions expressly designate who may bring such an action:
1. The Attorney-General or a provincial fiscal, either on official direction, on their own initiative, or upon the relation of another person (Sections 199 & 200).

The law is exclusive (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius). A private citizen who does not claim, or who fails to prove, a personal right to the office in question has no legal standing to institute a quo warranto proceeding. The requirement in Section 202 that the complaint must aver the plaintiff’s right to the office confirms this necessity.

Since Acosta admitted and the evidence confirmed that he failed to establish his right to the office of Municipal President, the fundamental basis of his action was destroyed. Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed his complaint. There was no need to proceed to examine Flor’s right to the office because the action itself was not maintainable by the plaintiff. The Court therefore declined to rule on the validity of Flor’s election.