G.R. No. L-2945, October 28, 1905

B.H. MACKE, ET AL., plaintiffs, vs. JOSE CAMPS, defendant.

FACTS:
This case originated as an application for an injunction filed by Jose Camps (the defendant in the original case). The application sought to restrain Judge John C. Sweeney of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the city sheriff from enforcing a judgment rendered in favor of B.H. Macke et al. against Camps. The judgment had been rendered, and Camps had given notice of appeal and was preparing his bill of exceptions. However, the trial court issued a special order allowing execution of the judgment to proceed pending appeal. Camps then filed this application to prevent the levy of that execution while his appeal was pending.

ISSUE:
Whether a preliminary injunction should be issued to restrain the enforcement of the judgment (via execution) pending Camps’s appeal.

RULING:
The Supreme Court DENIED the application for a preliminary injunction.

The Court held that the issuance of an execution pending appeal is governed by Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). This section provides that, except by special order of the court, no execution shall issue upon a final judgment until after the period for perfecting a bill of exceptions has expired. By this provision, the legislator placed the issuance of such a special order within the discretion of the trial court.

The Supreme Court ruled that it will not interfere with or inquire into the exercise of this statutorily conferred discretion, unless it is alleged and proven that:
1. There has been an abuse or excess of authority by the trial judge; or
2. Conditions have changed so substantially since the order’s issuance as to necessitate appellate intervention to protect the parties’ interests against unanticipated contingencies.

The Court found that the complaint filed by Camps failed to allege any facts showing the existence of either ground for relief. Since the application did not demonstrate that the principal relief (a permanent injunction) should be granted, the preliminary injunction was denied. The Court also noted certain defects in the form of the application but based its denial primarily on the substantive insufficiency of the allegations.