GR L 1561; (April, 1906) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-1561 : April 16, 1906
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. A. S. WATSON & CO., ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
On January 25, 1901, Francisco Enriquez, as executor of the estate of Antonio Enriquez, leased a property on the Escolta, Manila, to A. S. Watson & Co. for a term of twelve years at a monthly rent of ₱1,200. The lease contract stipulated that the rent “shall be paid monthly in advance in the first days of each month.” The defendants failed to pay the rent for November 1901. On December 13, 1901, the plaintiff, Rafael Enriquez (as successor administrator), filed an action for ejectment (forcible entry and detainer) against the defendants in the justice of the peace court, alleging illegal occupation due to nonpayment of rent. On the same day the action was filed, the defendants deposited in court the rent for November and December 1901. The justice of the peace ruled in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the ejectment of the defendants and awarding damages for their occupation after November 1, 1901. The defendants appealed.
ISSUE:
Was the action for ejectment based on nonpayment of rent prematurely commenced, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
The Court held that for an action of forcible entry and detainer based on nonpayment of rent to be validly commenced, a demand for payment must be made upon the tenant after the rent becomes due, and the tenant must be given thirty days from such demand to pay before suit can be filed. The lease required payment “in the first days of each month,” which the Court interpreted to mean from the 1st to the 10th day of the month. The rent for November 1901, therefore, became due on November 10. The record showed no demand for payment was made on or after November 10. Consequently, the action filed on December 13, 1901, was premature as it was commenced before the expiration of the 30-day period required by law after a valid demand. Following its precedent in Saez Co-Tiongco vs. Co Quing Co, the lack of a proper demand and the premature filing meant the justice of the peace court lacked jurisdiction over the case. This jurisdictional defect was not cured by the appeal to the Court of First Instance. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.