G.R. No. L-5254
ANICETO GOMEZ MEDEL, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PEDRO AVECILLA, administrator of the intestate estate of Andres Madrid, deceased, defendant-appellee.
March 17, 1910

FACTS:
Andres Madrid died on June 26, 1901. His widow initiated intestate estate proceedings on June 7, 1907. Madrid’s will, executed on November 14, 1890, was presented on June 11, 1907, but its legalization was denied due to a legal defect (lack of specified hour of execution). Despite this, the will contained an acknowledgment of a debt of 9,000 pesos owed by Madrid to Aniceto Gomez Medel, who was also named an executor in the will but declined the appointment.

Intestate proceedings continued, and commissioners were appointed. Medel filed his claim for 9,000 pesos, which was admitted. Pedro Avecilla, the administrator of the intestate estate, appealed the commissioners’ decision to the Court of First Instance (CFI). In the CFI, Medel sought payment of the debt with legal interest from June 16, 1901. The administrator raised the special defense of prescription.

The CFI held that while the document was not valid as a will, it was valid as a public instrument, and the acknowledgment of debt therein was conclusive evidence. The CFI noted that the acknowledgment was made in November 1890, Madrid died in June 1901, and Medel did not pursue his claim until 1907more than 16 years since the debt acknowledgment. Applying Article 1964 of the Civil Code, which sets a 15-year prescriptive period for personal actions, the CFI ruled that Medel’s action had prescribed. Medel appealed, arguing that the debt was an encumbrance on the inheritance, prescription should not run after the debtor’s death until the estate is settled, and the acknowledgment in a will should be effective from the testator’s death, not the document’s date.

ISSUE:
Did the action for the collection of the debt acknowledged in the public instrument (purported will) of Andres Madrid prescribe under Article 1964 of the Civil Code? Specifically:
1. Does the prescriptive period for a debt acknowledged in a public instrument (invalid as a will) begin from the date of the instrument or from the testator’s death?
2. Does the debtor’s death interrupt the running of the prescriptive period before the estate is legally settled?
3. Is the debt considered an encumbrance on the inheritance, payable within two years after partition, regardless of prior prescription?

RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the CFI, ruling that Medel’s action had prescribed.

1. Commencement of Prescriptive Period: The document, while invalid as a will, was valid as a public instrument. An acknowledgment of a pre-existing debt contained within it constitutes authentic evidence of an obligation. The validity and effectiveness of such an obligation do not depend on the testator’s death (when a will takes effect) but from the actual date the obligation was contracted. If not explicitly stated, it takes effect from the date the written declaration and acknowledgment of its existence was made. In this case, that date was November 14, 1890. Since the action was not prosecuted until mid-1907, more than 15 years had elapsed.
2. Effect of Debtor’s Death: The death of the debtor does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period. The estate of the deceased is a juridical person that continues the rights and obligations of the former owner, and its representative can be sued by the creditor. Medel, as an appointed executor in possession of the will, had the power and means to interrupt the prescriptive period by initiating testamentary proceedings after Madrid’s death. His failure to do so for over 16 years constituted inaction or negligence.
3. Hereditary Debts: While hereditary debts are indeed an encumbrance upon the inheritance and must be deducted before the true inheritance is determined, this principle does not suspend or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for claims that existed prior to the debtor’s death. The creditor’s diligence in enforcing their rights is paramount.

Therefore, the personal action to collect the debt, having been initiated more than fifteen years after the debt was acknowledged, had clearly prescribed.