G.R. No. L-4389
GLICERIA MARELLA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTE REYES, administrator of the intestate estate of Filomeno Encarnacion, and JOSE T. PATERNO, defendants-appellees.
November 10, 1908

FACTS:
Gliceria Marella sought to exclude four parcels of land from the inventory of the intestate estate of Filomeno Encarnacion, asserting that the properties belonged to her. The administrator, Vicente Reyes, did not oppose the claim. However, Jose T. Paterno, a creditor of the deceased, intervened in the action to oppose Marella’s petition. Marella’s claim was based on her testimony that she had lent money to Filomeno Encarnacion and his wife, Andrea Goco. In 1898, they settled accounts, and as a guarantee, delivered their possessory information titles to her. In 1899, due to their inability to pay, they orally agreed that Marella would take the land, allowing them to continue cultivating it, with half the crop (after expenses) going to her. Marella’s testimony was corroborated by her brother and another witness, and further confirmed by the deceased’s widow who admitted to another creditor that she had delivered the titles to Marella as a guarantee for a debt and made no claim to the land.

The Court of First Instance denied Marella’s petition, largely by disregarding her testimony. The trial judge invoked Section 383, subdivision 7 of Act No. 190 (the Dead Man’s Statute) on his own motion, stating that Marella was an incompetent witness because her testimony pertained to matters occurring before the death of Filomeno Encarnacion, and the opposing party had not objected to her competency during trial. The appellant also challenged the procedural propriety of Paterno’s intervention, which was made by motion and not by cross-complaint.

ISSUE:
1. Was the intervention by Jose T. Paterno proper, despite being made by motion and not by cross-complaint?
2. Should the real property claimed by Gliceria Marella have been excluded from the inventory of Filomeno Encarnacion’s estate?

RULING:
1. Yes, the intervention was proper. The Court held that intervention by motion is an acceptable procedure, consistent with its prior ruling in Behn, Meyer and Co. vs. Banco Español-Filipino. The Court interpreted Section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure “in accordance with the nature of the remedy, rather than with the literal wording of the section.”

2. Yes, the real property should have been excluded from the inventory.
On the Admissibility of Plaintiff’s Testimony: The Court ruled that the trial judge erred in disregarding Marella’s testimony sua sponte. The disqualification of a witness under the Dead Man’s Statute (Sec. 383, subd. 7, Act No. 190) is a rule of convenience for litigants, which they may waive. By failing to interpose a timely objection to the witness’s competency, the opposing party (Paterno) waived his right. Once admitted without objection, the testimony becomes part of the record for what it is worth, and the judge has no power to disregard it or strike it out on his own motion.
On the Validity of the Contract: The Court held that the oral contract made between the deceased and his wife, and the plaintiff, although not in writing, was valid. Citing Civil Code Articles 1280 and 1464, and prior jurisprudence, the Court found that the delivery of the title deeds (possessory information) effectively served as the delivery of the property itself, thereby transferring ownership to Marella. Furthermore, Marella’s claim was substantially proven by other corroborating witnesses, independent of her own testimony.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance was reversed, and the land was ordered excluded from the inventory of Filomeno Encarnacion’s estate.