G.R. No. L-4450
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUCINA MACASPAC, defendant-appellant.
November 14, 1908

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FACTS:
On July 30, 1906, Lucina Macaspac received P31.50 from Joaquina Punu to deliver to Marcelina Dy-Oco. Instead of delivering it, Macaspac visited Dy-Oco and falsely claimed that Punu had sent for P30. Believing Macaspac, Dy-Oco gave her P30. Macaspac retained both the P31.50 and the P30. The fraud was discovered in November when Punu and Dy-Oco met and discussed the matter. They confronted Macaspac, who admitted the truth and, by way of compromise, signed a document acknowledging her P30 indebtedness to Dy-Oco and agreeing to wash linen for the P31.50 she received from Punu.

Macaspac was charged with and convicted of estafa by the lower court for both amounts, sentenced to five months of arresto mayor, ordered to indemnify the injured parties, and to pay costs. She appealed the decision.

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ISSUE:
1. Whether the complaint, which charged two distinct crimes of estafa (one for P31.50 from Punu and another for P30 from Dy-Oco), violated Section 11 of General Orders No. 58 (which mandates that only one crime shall be charged in a complaint or information).
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Marcelina Dy-Oco to testify that the P30 was taken by deceit, contrary to a document which appeared to record it as a loan, thereby allegedly violating Section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the parol evidence rule).

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RULING:
1. No, the complaint defect cannot be raised on appeal. The Court held that the objection regarding the complaint charging two crimes constituted a “dilatory plea” under Section 21 of General Orders No. 58. Such a plea must be raised before the trial begins. Since the accused, assisted by counsel, did not object to the complaint, participated in the trial, presented evidence, and testified on the facts, she waived this objection. The Court further noted that this defect was merely one of form and did not prejudice her essential rights, thus not warranting a reversal of the judgment under Section 10 of General Orders No. 58.

2. No, the testimony was admissible, and Section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure is inapplicable. The Court found that the P30 was obtained by Macaspac through deceit, not as a loan, as she falsely claimed Punu had sent for it. The document signed in November was a subsequent compromise agreement intended to secure payment for the unlawfully obtained amount, not a record of the original fraudulent transaction. Macaspac, as the principal actor, was fully aware that the money was not a loan. Section 333 (estoppel) applies when one intentionally induces another to believe a fact and act upon it; it does not apply to a situation where the accused was conscious of her own deceitful actions. Furthermore, Dy-Oco’s testimony was admissible to explain the circumstances preceding and leading to the execution of the compromise document, as permitted by the last paragraph of Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and was received without objection from the defense.

The Court, finding no reversible error, affirmed the judgment of the lower court.