FACTS:
On October 25, 1906, an amended complaint for libel was filed against Julio Bustos in the city of Manila. The complaint alleged that on or about March 21, 1906, Julio Bustos willfully, unlawfully, and maliciously wrote and published a false, scandalous, and defamatory publication against Vicente Singson Encarnacion (then Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur) and Dionisio Chanco (then Judge of the Court of First Instance for the Second Judicial District).

The libelous statements were contained in a communication sent by Bustos to the Secretary of Justice. Specifically, the communication alleged that Fiscal Singson improperly dismissed a murder case (No. 90) despite conclusive proof, and that rumors were current in Vigan that Fiscal Singson, Judge Chanco, and Clerk Alviar received P6,000 for the dismissal. It also cited corroborating rumors about Clerk Alviar’s corruption and his threat to expose the fiscal and judge if prosecuted for estafa.

The trial court found Julio Bustos guilty of libel and sentenced him to three months imprisonment, a P100 fine, and costs. Bustos appealed, admitting that the statements tended to impeach the honesty and reputation of the officials, but argued that the communication was privileged and made in good faith.

ISSUE:
Was the communication sent by Julio Bustos to the Secretary of Justice, alleging corruption by public officials, a privileged communication made in good faith, thereby exempting him from libel charges?

RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the conviction of Julio Bustos.

The Court held that while communications made to a proper department head regarding the misfeasance of a subordinate official are prima facie privileged under Section 9 of Act No. 277 (The Libel Law), this privilege is not absolute but only conditional. The immunity from liability for defamatory statements ceases if it is shown that the defendant acted with actual malice.

Malice, in this context, is presumed if the defamatory statements are proven false. The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove good faith and justifiable motive. The Court emphasized that it is not enough for the defendant to honestly believe the statements to be true; he must have some reasonable ground for such belief. Simply repeating unverified rumors, no matter how widespread, does not constitute good faith.

In Bustos‘ case, the Court found that he made no sufficient effort to ascertain the truth or falsity of the rumors before publishing them. His limited attempts at investigation were deemed insufficient to provide a reasonable basis for his allegations. By publishing false statements without reasonable grounds for believing them to be true, Julio Bustos was found to have acted with actual malice. Therefore, the communication, despite being directed to the Secretary of Justice, lost its privileged character and Bustos was held liable for libel.