[ A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336, June 02, 2020 ]

JOCELYN C. TALENS-DABON, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE HERMIN E. ARCEO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, RESPONDENT.

RE: PETITION FOR PAYMENT OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

SEPARATE OPINION

HERNANDO, J.:

I concur with the ponencia.

The Court had occasion to allow the release of 25% of retirement benefits of an administratively dismissed judge in the following cases:

In Sabitsana, Jr. v. Judge Villamor1 the Court explicitly declared that the allowance of 25% of former Judge Villamor’s retirement benefits was merely pro hac vice and will not serve as a precedent for other cases.2

In Atty. Meris v. Ofilada,3 former Judge Ofilada had served the government for 37 years when he was dismissed on the grounds of grave abuse of authority, evident partiality, gross incompetence, and ignorance of the law. It was his wife who requested the release of Judge Ofilada’s retirement benefits in her A Plea for Mercy before the Court, since Judge Ofilada was old, incapacitated, and in dire need of funds to cover his medical expenses. As former Judge Ofilada passed away pending consideration of his wife’s letter, the Court allowed the release of 25% of his retirement benefits, among other gratuities to his heirs, albeit citing its supposedly pro hac vice ruling in Sabitsana, Jr.

In In Re: An Undated Letter with the Heading “Expose” Of A Concerned Mediaman on the Alleged Illegal Acts of Judge Julian C. Ocampo III of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1 (MTCC), Naga City and Clerk of Court Renato C. San Juan, MTCC Naga City, the Court granted the release of 25% of his retirement benefits only upon former Judge Ocampo’s third plea.4

I also take the opportunity to mention Junio v. Judge Rivera, Jr.5 a case more factually similar to that of respondent herein.

In Junio, former Judge Rivera’s dismissal was grounded on gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the judiciary, having kissed his boarder’s daughter while drunk during his birthday party.6 The Court lifted his ban from public service and accorded him his due monetary gratuities in view of the following circumstances:

(1) His 35 years of government service;

(2) His case being his first and only administrative offense;

(3) He demonstrated sincere repentance;

(4) He applied for judicial clemency 10 years after his dismissal and “has come to terms with reality and learned [his] lesson”; and

(5) His regressing physical condition caused by old age and various illnesses, i.e., cataract, prostatic enlargement, postural vertigo, hypertension, and arthritis, necessitate financial support.7

Moreover, former Judge Rivera had never been found guilty of a criminal offense and never moved for the reconsideration of his dismissal, as he “accepted the verdict, in all humility.”8 Withal, the Court granted former Judge Rivera his prayer for judicial clemency in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, the letters dated November 17, 2004 and June 17, 2005 of respondent Judge Pedro C. Rivera, Jr. requesting judicial clemency is GRANTED. The prohibition for his “re-employment in any part of the government service including government-owned or controlled corporations” mandated in our Resolution dated August 30, 1993 is LIFTED. He is authorized (1) to be employed (if qualified) in any government office including government-owned or controlled corporations, and (2) to receive whatever monetary benefits due him for his long service in the government, if entitled thereto.9

The factual circumstances of these four cases do not align with those of herein respondent. From all the foregoing citations, the release of the dismissed judges’ retirement benefits was predicated by the most restrictive, compelling, and grievous circumstances. Respondent’s acts of atonement, however, only pale in comparison. His 18-year government service is quite lamentably short to be considered. His basic allegations of deteriorating health and increasing medical expenses are but common and inevitable costs of aging. Moreover, respondent’s expressions of remorse cannot be deemed at par with that of former Judge Rivera in Junio. Respondent’s obstinate and hypocritical refusal to admit to his guilt, even in the face of his criminal conviction, grew more palpable when he had filed two motions for reconsideration of his dismissal, both of which were denied.10

I also note that while the Court in Junio accorded full merit to former Judge Rivera’s hardships and gave him “whatever monetary benefits due him for his long service in the government, if entitled thereto[,]” there still was no express reinstatement of Judge Rivera’s retirement benefits. As respondent failed to rise up to Judge Rivera’s standard of acceptable penance, the former should not be allowed to enjoy more than what was accorded to the latter. In any case, respondent is already a fortunate beneficiary of the Court’s clemency when it restored in the November 20, 2012 Resolution respondent’s entitlement to his accrued leave benefits, and allowed his return to government service at the first formal instance that he sought judicial clemency.11

In addition, the gravity of respondent’s criminal conviction cannot be ignored. It should bar any further grant of benevolence.

Despite the irony, judicial leniency must be exercised only upon a strict assessment of its claimant’s worth. A dismissed judge’s plea for the Court’s compassion should pass rigid scrutiny before administrative penalties are reversed. If the Court would easily be swayed by a generic lapse of time and a sheaf of certifications of apparently-restored morals, penal clauses may lose its deterrent purpose. Errant but unapologetic judges should not be placed on equal footing with the ones who have endeavored to keep their service records pristine, or even with those who, while having strayed from the edicts of judicial moralities at first, eventually and thoroughly labored on a sincere and untrivial reformation.

In closing, I point out that the Court’s tone against sexual harassment in work environments has been set and is already resounding in the Court’s July 25, 1996 Resolution in this case:12

The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.13 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

The case should have ended with this July 25, 1996 Resolution dismissing respondent from service. Even so, the Court bestowed judicial clemency upon respondent in its November 20, 2012 Resolution, an award that is evidently beyond his professional merits and moral fiber. To grant further magnanimity to respondent is to cast serious doubt upon the competence of the judiciary in promoting healthy and safe working conditions especially for women, not only in the usual workplaces but also in the Court’s very own backyard. The Court should not contradict itself. Never in any case should it be the first one to evade this duty and inflict injustice.

Accordingly, I vote to DENY respondent’s claim for the release of 25% of his retirement benefits.

_________________________________

Footnotes

1  A.M. RTJ-90-474, RTJ-90-606, April 12, 1994, as cited in Guerrero v. Villamor, 357 Phil 90, 90-93 (1998).

2 Id. at 93.

3 419 Phil. 603 (2001).

4 A.M. No. 00-10-230-MTCC, December 9, 2003 and September 23, 2008, following the ponencia’s Draft Resolution of this case, p. 4.

5 A.M. No. MTJ-91-565, 509 Phil. 65 (2005).

6 Id. at 66.

7 Id. at 68.

8 Id. at 66.

9 Id. at 70.

10 Per the Court’s November 20, 2012 Resolution in this case, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336, 699 Phil. 1 (2012).

11 Id.

12 Supra note 10.

13 Id.

Batas Pinas