GR 12700; (September, 1917)

EN BANC

G.R. No. 12700; September 4, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PANTALEON OLAIS, defendant-appellant.

Benitez and Benitez for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The findings of fact are clearly stated by the trial court as follows:

This case happened at midnight of the cited date when Vivencio Tercero, on coming from a house where there was a certain dead person (casa mortuoria), in order to husk palay, was returning to the house of one Julian where he used to sleep, because his own house was quite far. On the way, these two accused and one Braulio had been waiting for Vivencio Tercero, and when the latter arrived at the place where they were, they called him, and the accused Jacinto Robles asked him why he had been in the house where the dead was. Vivencio Tercero answered Robles that he was courting a young lady named Paciencia Lera. Jacinto then told him to stop courting the girl. Vivencio answered that he could not do so, and that if Jacinto and his companion liked to court the girl they could do so at any time. The accused Pantaleon Reyes replied that whether Vivencio Tercero desisted or not they would injure him on that night, and they began to assault him. Vivencio Tercero fell to the ground, and his aggressors left him there thinking he was dead.

The wounds of the offended party lasted for thirty-five days before they were cured with medical assistance, he having spent for medicine the sum of P10. All the wounds are now healed; but the wound inflicted on the right hand which cut the arteries of the ring finger and the little finger makes said hand useless or at least the two fingers mentioned.

Additional to the foregoing it is only necessary to mention that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to support a judgment of conviction if it satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. In the present case the testimony of the complaining witness is positive, clear, and fee from contradiction. (U. S. vs. Dacotan, [1903], 1 Phil. Rep., 669; U. S. vs. Mondejar, [1911], 19 Phil. Rep., 158.) The accused relied on an alibi. But, to establish such a defense, it must be proved by nothing less than full, clear, and satisfactory evidence. In the present case an alibi has not been proved by probable evidence which reasonably satisfies the court of the truth of such a defense. (U. S. vs. Pascua [1903], 1 Phil. Rep., 631; U. S. vs. Oxiles [1915], 29 Phil. Rep., 587.)

There being present in the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the sentence of the trial court must be modified by imposing upon the defendant and appellant the maximum penalty, which is two years eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional, with one-half of the costs of the first instance and all the costs of this instance, and to indemnify, with his coaccused who did not appeal, singly and jointly, the offended party Vicente Tercero in the amount of P62.50, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

STREET, J., concurring:

I concur on the ground that the proof of alibi presented in this case is not such as reasonable to satisfy the court of its truthfulness; but I regret to see the unqualified proposition appear in the opinion of the court to the effect that an alibi “must be proved by full, clear, and satisfactory evidence.” The use of this unqualified language tends to give currency to the idea that when proof of an alibi is offered in a criminal case the burden of proof for some mysterious reason shifts to the defendant. This is certainly not true. The burden of proof rests upon the Government to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt; and this onus must be sustained throughout and in respect to every essential factor necessary to make out the crime. The expressions found in the book indicating that an alibi must be proved to the satisfaction of the court have their origin in the circumstances that when proof of an alibi is introduced it comes from the defendant at a time when there has already been placed before the court evidence connecting the defendant with the crime. In such situation the defendant must first meet and overcome what has already been offered before a reasonable doubt as to his guilt can arise in the mind of the judge. Consequently the proof which he may be required to adduce in order to generate a reasonable doubt of his guilt will depend upon the weight and character of the evidence already before the court showing or tending to show his connection with the crime. In regard to the proof of the alibi presented in U. S. vs. Pascua (1 Phil. Rep., 631), the court in that case said: “While the proof as to the alibi is well supported by the testimony of witnesses, yet such proof can have little weight when the identity of the defendants as the persons who committed the offense has been fully established by eyewitnesses.” (Emphasis ours). In U. S. vs. Oxiles (29 Phil. Rep., 587, 592), Justice Torres quotes the following syllabus from an American decision: “Where the Commonwealth rests upon positive and undoubted proof of the prisoner’s guilt, it should not be overcome by less than full, clear and satisfactory evidence of the alleged alibi.” When the words “full, clear, and satisfactory evidence” are thus put in opposition to the words “positive and undoubted proof,” as here, there can be little objection to the mode of statement; but it is obvious that the words “full, clear, and satisfactory evidence” would never be penned by a judge whose mind was not in a measure preoccupied with the fact that the positive evidence connecting the accused with the crime and already before the court is sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, apart from the alibi. The language in question should therefore in our opinion not be stated in the form of an abstract rule.

Batas Pinas