G.R. No. 191611 -14, April 5, 2022
LIBRADO M. CABRERA AND FE M. CABRERA, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

This case involves a Motion for Reconsideration of a Decision dated July 29, 2019, which affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s convictions. Petitioners Librado M. Cabrera and Fe M. Cabrera, former Municipal Mayors of Taal, Batangas, were charged in four consolidated criminal cases for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
In Criminal Case Nos. 27555 and 27557, petitioners were charged, in conspiracy with Municipal Councilor Luther H. Leonor, with giving unwarranted benefits to Diamond Laboratories, Inc. (DLI) by directly purchasing medicines from it without public bidding. DLI was owned by relatives of Librado (by consanguinity) and Fe (by affinity). The purchases amounted to P503,920.35 under Librado’s tenure and P1,042,902.46 under Fe’s tenure.
In Criminal Case Nos. 27556 and 27558, petitioners were separately charged for causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits to themselves by reimbursing from municipal funds their expenses for unauthorized travels, amounting to P27,651.83 for Librado and P170,987.66 for Fe.
Petitioners defended the purchases as emergency procurements exempt from bidding. They claimed their travels were verbally authorized by the Provincial Governor and later ratified in writing, and were necessary for official functions. Luther Leonor claimed he merely collected payments for DLI without discharging official functions related to the procurement.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty. The Supreme Court, in its July 29, 2019 Decision, affirmed the convictions, ruling that the prosecution proved all elements of the crime. The purchases violated procurement laws and were not justified as emergency purchases. The travel reimbursements were improper as the travels lacked the required prior authorization.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should grant the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and reverse its Decision affirming their convictions for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration and AFFIRMED its prior Decision with MODIFICATION, deleting the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
The Court held that all elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were proven beyond reasonable doubt:
1. Accused are Public Officers: Petitioners were Municipal Mayors during the relevant periods.
2. Accused acted with Manifest Partiality, Evident Bad Faith, or Gross Inexcusable Negligence: The Court found gross inexcusable negligence.
* For the purchases (Criminal Case Nos. 27555 & 27557): Petitioners failed to comply with the mandatory procedure for emergency purchases under the Local Government Code. They did not issue a certification on the necessity of an emergency purchase, and the purchases were made from a single supplier (DLI) owned by relatives, without canvassing other sources to ensure the best price. Their claim of an emergency due to a dengue outbreak was belied by the lack of a municipal resolution declaring a state of calamity and the prolonged period over which the purchases were made.
* For the travel reimbursements (Criminal Case Nos. 27556 & 27558): Petitioners failed to secure the prior travel authority required by the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules. The subsequent written ratification by the Governor did not cure the absence of prior authority. Reimbursing unauthorized travel expenses constituted gross inexcusable negligence.
3. Accused caused Undue Injury to any Party, including the Government, or gave any Private Party any Unwarranted Benefit, Advantage, or Preference:
The irregular purchases gave unwarranted benefit/advantage to DLI.
The improper reimbursements gave unwarranted benefits to petitioners themselves.
* The government suffered undue injury by being deprived of public funds without proper justification.
The Court also found conspiracy between petitioners and Luther Leonor in the procurement cases, as his actions in representing DLI and receiving payments were indispensable to the scheme.
The penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office was deleted because it is not a penalty prescribed under Article IX of R.A. 3019 for violations of Section 3. The proper penalties are imprisonment and temporary disqualification.
The Court found no merit in petitioners’ other arguments, including claims of violation of their right to a speedy trial and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, which was sufficiently overturned by the prosecution’s evidence.