G.R. No. 264071 . August 13, 2024.
BEN D. LADILAD, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MARY GRACE BANDOY, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

This is a Separate Concurring Opinion by Justice Caguioa. The main case involves a petition concerning the preliminary investigation conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) against Ben D. Ladilad (Ladilad) for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code during the 2013 elections. During the Court’s deliberations, it was suggested that while COMELEC delayed in resolving the preliminary investigation, Ladilad had acquiesced to the delay by allowing his motion for reconsideration to remain unresolved for eight years without objection. It was noted that Ladilad filed only one motion for early resolution, which sought to expedite the main preliminary investigation case, not the specific motion for reconsideration stage where the delay occurred. Justice Caguioa disagreed with this suggestion, arguing it was contrary to settled jurisprudence.

ISSUE

Whether the period for determining inordinate delay in a preliminary investigation includes the time taken to resolve a motion for reconsideration, and whether a respondent’s failure to repeatedly object to such delay constitutes waiver or acquiescence.

RULING

Justice Caguioa concurs with the ponencia and provides the following clarifications:
1. Computation of Delay: Following the precedent in Peñas v. COMELEC, the total period for assessing inordinate delay in a preliminary investigation spans from the filing of the complaint to the final resolution of any motion for reconsideration. In this case, the delay should be computed from June 27, 2013 (filing of complaint) to September 27, 2022 (resolution of the motion for reconsideration), totaling over nine years, not just the eight-year delay on the motion for reconsideration.
2. Waiver or Acquiescence: A respondent’s single objection to delay, made after the prescribed period for resolution has lapsed, is sufficient. The duty to justify delay lies with COMELEC once it fails to resolve a case within its own rules (30 days for the COMELEC en banc per the COMELEC Rules of Procedure). Requiring litigants to repeatedly remind COMELEC of its duty is unreasonable and encourages official slackness. Ladilad’s filing of a motion for early resolution during the initial delay negates any claim of acquiescence to the subsequent protracted delay.
3. Legitimate Avenue to Object: The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, like the Ombudsman’s rules cited in Javier v. Sandiganbayan and applied in Peñas, prohibit motions to dismiss except on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, a respondent in a COMELEC preliminary investigation lacks a legitimate procedural avenue (such as a motion to dismiss) to formally invoke the right to speedy disposition of cases. A motion for early resolution, which merely prays for expedition, is not equivalent to invoking this fundamental right. Thus, Ladilad, like the respondent in Peñas, had no proper channel to object to the inordinate delay.