G.R. No. 197291; April 3, 2013
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner, vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr. was among the principal suspects charged with multiple murder for the Maguindanao massacre of November 23, 2009. A Special Panel of Prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation. In a joint resolution dated February 5, 2010, the Panel charged 196 individuals, partly relying on the twin affidavits of Kenny Dalandag dated December 7, 2009, wherein Dalandag confessed his participation in the massacre. Subsequently, on August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program (WPP) of the DOJ and was listed as a prosecution witness. Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima on October 14, 2010, requesting the inclusion of Dalandag as an accused in the murder informations, citing Dalandag’s sworn admissions. This request was reiterated but was denied by Secretary De Lima on November 2, 2010. Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as an accused. The RTC dismissed the petition on June 27, 2011. Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether respondents may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to investigate and prosecute Kenny Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in the Maguindanao massacre cases, notwithstanding his admission into the Witness Protection Program and his sworn admissions of participation.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the dismissal of the petition for mandamus. The Court held that the prosecution of crimes is an executive function vested in the Department of Justice. Public prosecutors possess wide discretion in determining whom to charge, based on their appreciation of evidence and factors such as the availability of a witness for the state. A writ of mandamus cannot be used to control or dictate the exercise of this discretion; it may only compel a duty to act, but not to act in a specific manner (i.e., to charge or not to charge a particular individual). The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors in excluding Dalandag as an accused. His admission into the WPP constitutes a valid exception to the general rule under Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that an information must include all persons responsible. A participant in a crime may legally become a state witness either through discharge from the information under the Rules of Court or through admission into the WPP under Republic Act No. 6981. The Panel’s decision to utilize Dalandag as a state witness, rather than indict him, was a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion aimed at ensuring the successful prosecution of the principal accused and did not amount to an evasion of a positive duty. Therefore, mandamus does not lie.