G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from a petition filed by former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez following the departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and his own nomination as a potential successor. Chavez sought a determination of: 1) whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one member of Congress to sit in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC); and 2) if the practice of having two representatives from each House of Congress with one vote each is constitutional. Historically, from its creation, the JBC had one congressional representative, with the Senate and House of Representatives alternating. In 1994, this changed, and both Houses began sitting simultaneously, initially with one-half vote each, and from 2001 onwards, with one full vote each. On July 17, 2012, the Court granted Chavez’s petition, declaring the JBC’s eight-member composition unconstitutional and ordering it to reconstitute with only one congressional representative. The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE

The primary issue for reconsideration is whether the Court should reverse its July 17, 2012 Decision, which held that the Constitution mandates only one (1) representative from the entire Congress to sit as an ex-officio member of the JBC, thereby declaring the practice of having two simultaneous representatives unconstitutional.

RULING

The Court DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration and AFFIRMED its July 17, 2012 Decision. The Court held that the constitutional text of Section 8(1), Article VIII is clear: it provides for “a representative of the Congress” (singular). The Framers’ deliberate choice of the singular “a” indicates an intent for Congress to have only one seat on the JBC. The Court rejected the argument that the Framers committed an oversight by not adjusting this provision to reflect the shift to a bicameral legislature, noting that other constitutional provisions explicitly mention “both Houses” or “voting separately” when bicameral action is required (e.g., in presidential ties, VP replacement confirmations, and martial law revocation). The absence of such language in the JBC provision signifies that Congress’s role in the JBC is not an exercise of its primary legislative function but a contributory, non-legislative function to the executive’s appointing power. Therefore, the JBC must be composed of only seven members, with Congress entitled to just one representative. The Court suspended the immediate executory clause of its original decision pending this resolution but ultimately upheld the directive for the JBC to reconstitute itself accordingly.