G.R. No. 193314; June 25, 2013
Svetlana P. Jalosjos, Petitioner, vs. Commission on Elections, Edwin Elim Tupag and Rodolfo Y. Estrellada, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Svetlana P. Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Decision dated February 26, 2013. Private respondents Edwin Elim Tupag and Rodolfo Y. Estrellada filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The case stemmed from a challenge to petitioner’s eligibility to run for office due to failure to meet the one-year residency requirement. Petitioner claimed to be an actual and physical resident of Barangay Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental since 2008 after purchasing property there on December 9, 2008. To support her claim, she presented a Joint Affidavit from witnesses. The affidavit stated that construction of the residential house and other resort infrastructures began in January 2009 and was still ongoing as of December 2009. It also stated that while her house was being constructed, petitioner used to stay at the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap in Barangay Punta Miray, which is within the same municipality. Petitioner argued that her stay in Barangay Punta Miray should be counted towards her residency in Baliangao. She also argued that her voter registration presupposed six months of prior residence, her Certificate of Candidacy should not be cancelled absent a finding of deliberate deception, and that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction after her proclamation.

ISSUE

The primary issues raised in the motions for reconsideration are: (1) Whether the Court erred in finding inconsistencies in the Joint Affidavit of petitioner’s witnesses; (2) Whether petitioner’s stay in Barangay Punta Miray should be considered in determining her compliance with the one-year residency requirement in Baliangao; (3) Whether petitioner’s voter registration presupposes she has stayed in the municipality for at least six months prior; (4) Whether petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy should be cancelled absent a finding of a deliberate attempt to deceive; and (5) Whether the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction after petitioner’s proclamation. A secondary issue, raised by private respondents, is who between the vice-mayor and the second placer shall assume office upon the final determination of petitioner’s ineligibility.

RULING

The Court denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the partial motion for reconsideration of private respondents.
1. The Court found no error in its conclusion that there were inconsistencies in the Joint Affidavit. The witnesses’ declaration that petitioner had been an “actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008” was contradicted by their own statements that construction of her residential house began only in January 2009 and was still ongoing in December 2009, and that she stayed in Mrs. Yap’s house in another barangay while her house was being built. The mere purchase of land in December 2008 does not establish residence. The absence of any photograph or proof of a completed residential structure as of December 2009 bolstered the conclusion that she had not yet established actual and physical residence in Barangay Tugas at that time.
2. Petitioner’s temporary and intermittent stay in Mrs. Yap’s house in Barangay Punta Miray does not amount to residence for purposes of the one-year requirement. The Court distinguished this case from Mitra v. COMELEC and Sabili v. COMELEC, where the claimants presented stronger evidence of a dwelling place and intent to reside. A temporary stay in a stranger’s house cannot be equated with establishing a domicile.
3. Voter registration does not conclusively establish residency for the purpose of determining qualification to run for office. The act of registration is merely a claim of residence, which can be rebutted by evidence.
4. A false material representation in a Certificate of Candidacy regarding eligibility, such as residency, is a valid ground for cancellation, even absent proof of a deliberate intent to deceive the electorate. The requirement is the fact of ineligibility.
5. The COMELEC retains jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case even after the candidate’s proclamation. The proclamation of a candidate does not bar the COMELEC from continuing its inquiry into the candidate’s qualifications.
6. On the issue of succession, the Court ruled that the permanent vacancy in the office of mayor, created by the final determination of petitioner’s ineligibility, shall be filled by the vice-mayor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code, and not by the second-placer.