G.R. No. L-22314, May 29, 1971.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF PEH LAY BEN alias LIAO KAY CHAY TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, PEH LAY BEN alias LIAO KAY CHAY, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS

Peh Lay Ben alias Liao Kay Chay filed a petition for naturalization on July 19, 1960. The State opposed. After hearings, the trial court granted the petition. The State appealed. The evidence showed appellee was born in Amoy, China on June 30, 1929, arrived in the Philippines in 1937, and had resided at various addresses in Manila, including Nueva Street, Dapitan Street, and Alvarado Street. He made multiple trips to China and Hongkong between 1946 and 1960. He married in China in 1947 and had four children, all residing in Hongkong until they came to the Philippines as temporary visitors in December 1960. At the time of his application, he was employed by Hong Moh Tea Firm with a monthly salary of P380.00. In his petition, he alleged his present residence was 473 Nueva St., Manila, and his former residence during the Japanese occupation was Dapitan St., Quezon City, but did not mention his residence at Alvarado Street from 1945 to 1946. During the proceedings, the case was reopened to allow appellee to present additional evidence regarding his income for 1961, where he claimed to have received representation allowances from Cortez Transportation Inc. (P2,000) and People’s Trading (P1,500).

ISSUE

1. Whether appellee failed to comply with the legal requirement to allege all his former places of residence in his petition.
2. Whether appellee had a lucrative occupation or income.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and denied the petition for naturalization.
1. On the allegation of residence: The Court held that appellee’s failure to disclose his residence at Alvarado Street, Manila, from 1945 to 1946 in his petition was fatal. The law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act 473) requires strict compliance in stating all former places of residence to enable the State to conduct necessary inquiries into the applicant’s character and moral fitness. The Court rejected appellee’s claim that the omission was due to the temporary nature of the stay, citing precedents (De Pek Long vs. Republic, Keng Giok vs. Republic, Go Bok vs. Republic) that even temporary residences must be alleged.
2. On lucrative income: The Court found appellee’s evidence of lucrative income insufficient and suspicious. His original evidence showed only a P380 monthly salary from Hong Moh Tea Firm, which was inadequate to support his wife and four children. The additional income evidence presented after the reopening (P2,000 from Cortez Transportation Inc. and P1,500 from People’s Trading) was deemed highly suspicious because it contradicted his prior sworn statements and testimony that he had no other income. The Court noted the P1,500 was described as a “gift,” which was not a stable source of income. Citing precedents (Justo Tan vs. Republic, Keng Giok vs. Republic), the Court held that even higher incomes had been deemed insufficient for a family of similar size. Given the resolution of these two issues, the Court deemed it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the State. The decision appealed from was reversed and set aside.