GR 171315; (February, 2008) (Digest)
G.R. No. 171315 ; February 26, 2008
ANTONIO ARBIZO, petitioner, vs. SPS. ANTONIO SANTILLAN and ROSARIO L. SANTILLAN, SPS. JOHN WASSMER and LUZ MARCELO-WASSMER, and PACITA MARCELO, respondents.
FACTS
Respondents, claiming ownership over three adjoining parcels of land in Cabangan, Zambales by virtue of separate Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) issued in 1998, filed separate Complaints for Ejectment against petitioner Antonio Arbizo. They alleged that after purchasing the lots, they enclosed them with a fence, which petitioner unlawfully destroyed and replaced with his own concrete fence in September 2000, refusing to vacate despite demands. Petitioner countered that the disputed lots are portions of a larger property inherited from his father, Celestino Arbizo, who possessed it since 1921. He asserted prior physical possession, supported by a tax declaration in his father’s name and deeds of sale from siblings conveying shares to his wife, and claimed his possession included the contested areas long before respondents acquired their titles.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) dismissed the complaints, finding petitioner’s possession prior and preferential. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed this. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed, ordering petitioner to vacate, giving credence to respondents’ titles and their act of fencing as evidence of prior possession.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the lower courts and ruling that respondents had a better right of possession in the ejectment cases.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the MCTC and RTC decisions dismissing the ejectment complaints. In an ejectment suit, the sole issue is physical or material possession (possession de facto), independent of claims of ownership. The party who proves prior physical possession prevails. Here, the MCTC and RTC, based on evidence including an ocular inspection, found petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest were in prior physical possession of the property, which included the disputed lots, long before respondents’ acquisition in 1998. Petitioner’s possession was evidenced by existing huts and improvements on the land.
The respondents’ act of fencing the property in 1998, while indicative of an attempt to take possession, did not conclusively establish prior possession over petitioner, who was already physically present on the land. A Torrens title does not automatically confer a superior right of possession in an ejectment case; the issue is narrowed to who had prior physical possession. Since petitioner demonstrated prior possession, the ejectment actions must fail. The proper recourse for respondents, as titled owners, is to file an accion publiciana or reinvindicatory action to recover possession based on their superior title, not an ejectment suit which is summary and limited to the question of prior physical possession.