GR 144662; (October, 2003) (Digest)
G.R. No. 144662; October 13, 2003
SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners Spouses Mason filed a complaint for rescission of a lease contract and damages against respondent Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. The lease contract required Columbus to construct a building worth ten million pesos, which it failed to do. Summons was served upon Columbus through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. The sheriff’s return described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president authorized to receive processes. Columbus failed to answer, leading the RTC to declare it in default, allow ex-parte presentation of evidence, and render a judgment by default ordering rescission and awarding damages to the petitioners.
After the judgment became final, Columbus filed a motion to lift the order of default, which the RTC denied. The RTC also granted the petitioners’ motion for execution. Columbus then appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent Columbus through a valid service of summons.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction due to invalid service of summons. Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, service of summons upon a domestic private juridical entity must be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. The service made upon Ayreen Rejalde, who was merely a filing clerk as evidenced by her employment record, did not substantially comply with this mandatory rule. The sheriff’s unilateral characterization of her as a secretary to the president was insufficient to validate the service.
Consequently, all subsequent proceedings, including the declaration of default, the judgment by default, and the writ of execution, were null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the respondent. The Court emphasized that the rules on service of summons are strictly construed, and jurisdiction over a corporation is secured only by proper service upon the officers enumerated in the rules. Since jurisdiction was never acquired, the merits of the motion to lift the order of default were rendered moot. The case was remanded to the trial court for proper service of summons and further proceedings.