G.R. No. 143439 . October 14, 2005.
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner, vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ, Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Maximo Alvarez was charged with arson for allegedly setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law, respondent Susan Ramirez. During the trial, the prosecution called Esperanza Alvarez, the petitioner’s wife, as a witness against him. She testified that she saw her husband pour gasoline and ignite the house. The petitioner initially raised no objection to her testimony. However, after her direct examination, he filed a motion to disqualify her as a witness based on the marital disqualification rule under Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion, disqualifying Esperanza and ordering her testimony stricken from the records.
Respondent Ramirez filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court nullified the trial court’s orders, ruling that Esperanza could testify. The court found that the marital disqualification rule did not apply because the offense directly attacked the conjugal relation and the spouses were already separated de facto. Petitioner Alvarez now seeks a review of this decision before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Esperanza Alvarez is disqualified from testifying against her husband, the petitioner, in the criminal case for arson.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that Esperanza Alvarez is not disqualified from testifying. The marital disqualification rule under Section 22, Rule 130 prohibits a spouse from testifying for or against the other without consent, except in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. The reasons for the rule—preserving marital harmony, preventing perjury, and safeguarding marital confidences—are inapplicable where the conjugal relation is already vitally impaired by the crime itself.
The Court applied the doctrine from Ordoño v. Daquigan, which states that the exception to the disqualification rule applies when an offense “directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation.” The crime of arson, committed against the house occupied by the petitioner’s own wife and her family, directly impairs that relation. Furthermore, the factual circumstances showed the marriage was already strained, with the spouses separated de facto prior to the incident. Consequently, the state’s interest in preserving marital peace yields to the paramount interest of discovering the truth and administering justice. The trial court was ordered to allow the testimony of Esperanza Alvarez.