G.R. No. 158848 /G.R. No. 171994; February 4, 2008
ESTEBAN YAU, petitioner, vs. RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., respondent. x——————————————x ARTURO MACAPAGAL, petitioner, vs. HON. IRENEO LEE GAKO, JR., et al.

FACTS

Esteban Yau purchased a promissory note from Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation (Philfinance) and paid P1.6 million. The checks issued to him by Philfinance were dishonored. Yau filed a complaint for recovery of sum and damages against Philfinance and its directors, including Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Arturo Macapagal. The defendants, except one, were declared in default for failure to answer. Their petition challenging the default order was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, a decision which became final. The trial court subsequently rendered a judgment in favor of Yau. The defendants’ notice of appeal was dismissed for non-payment of docket fees, and this order became final. A writ of execution was issued.
Silverio and Macapagal separately challenged the execution through petitions to the Supreme Court. In a 1997 Decision, the Court dismissed their petitions, and a 1998 Resolution denied their motions for reconsideration with finality. Despite this, Silverio filed a petition with the Court of Appeals in 1999 to quash the writ, arguing the judgment had become dormant due to non-execution for over five years. The CA granted his petition. Meanwhile, Macapagal filed a separate petition in the RTC to enjoin the execution, which was denied. The CA affirmed this denial. These conflicting CA decisions led to the consolidated petitions before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the final and executory judgment in favor of Yau had become dormant and unenforceable due to the alleged failure to execute it within five years.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the judgment had not become dormant. The prevailing doctrine is that the five-year period for enforcing a judgment by motion is reckoned from the date of its finality, not from the date of its entry. The judgment became final on December 26, 1991, when the order dismissing the defendants’ appeal became final. The writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992, well within the five-year period. Crucially, the sheriff’s act of garnishing bank deposits in December 1992 constituted a valid execution that effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. Subsequent efforts to execute the balance of the judgment were therefore not barred.
The Court emphasized the imperative of finality of judgments. The defendants had exhausted all legal remedies, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 1998 final Resolution. Any further attempt to delay or evade execution must be struck down. The statute of limitations is not intended to prejudice a prevailing party who is actively seeking to enforce a judgment. The Court reversed the CA decision favoring Silverio, affirmed the decision against Macapagal, and directed the trial court to continue execution until Yau’s award is fully satisfied.