G.R. No. 202223 . March 02, 2016
JOEY R. PEÑA, PETITIONER, VS. JESUS DELOS SANTOS AND THE HEIRS OF ROSITA DELOS SANTOS FLORES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Jesus Delos Santos and Rosita Delos Santos Flores were declared the lawful owners of a two-thirds portion of certain lots in Boracay in a 1996 RTC Decision. This judgment became final and executory. During execution proceedings, Joey Peña filed a Motion for Substitution and for a Writ of Execution, claiming ownership over a 2,000 sq m portion of the awarded property. He derived his title from Atty. Romeo Robiso, who had acquired the property from Jesus and Rosita through a Deed of Transfer and a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 2005 and confirmed in 2006. Atty. Robiso had been the counsel for Jesus and Rosita in the very case where the property was adjudicated to them, pursuant to a 1998 Attorney’s Agreement where his contingent fee was a portion of the property to be awarded.
The RTC granted Peña’s motion, ruling the conveyance valid as it occurred after final judgment. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC, declaring the sale between the clients and their lawyer, Atty. Robiso, null and void for being a prohibited transaction under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court initially denied Peña’s Petition for Review. Peña filed this Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should reconsider its denial and uphold the validity of the sale from the clients (Jesus and Rosita) to their lawyer (Atty. Robiso), and consequently, Peña’s derived title.

RULING

The Motion for Reconsideration is denied. The Court affirmed the CA’s ruling that the sale between Jesus/Rosita and their counsel, Atty. Robiso, is void. Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code expressly prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, the property and rights of their clients which are the subject of litigation handled by them. This prohibition is absolute, founded on public policy to prevent conflicts of interest and to ensure a lawyer’s fidelity to his client’s cause. The prohibition applies regardless of when the sale is consummated; it attaches once the attorney-client relationship exists concerning the specific property. Here, Atty. Robiso was engaged as counsel precisely for the case involving the subject property. His acquisition of that property, even after a favorable judgment, falls squarely within the prohibition, rendering the sale null and void.
Peña, as Atty. Robiso’s successor-in-interest, cannot acquire a better right than his predecessor. The defense of being a purchaser in good faith is unavailing. The principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to validate a transaction prohibited by law for reasons of public policy. The law aims to prevent the possibility of a lawyer enriching himself at the client’s expense, a policy that supersedes any claim of estoppel or good faith by a subsequent buyer. Since the root title (from Atty. Robiso) is void, Peña acquired no valid title. The Court’s prior resolution denying the petition for lack of reversible error stands.