GR 166755; (November, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 166755 November 18, 2005
ELMER F. CERVANTES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NORMA C. PERELLO, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, and PILAR S. ANTONIO (formerly PILAR A. CERVANTES), Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Elmer Cervantes filed a petition for annulment of marriage, which was granted by the trial court in 1996. The court also ordered the liquidation of conjugal properties. In 1999, the trial court issued a resolution ordering the sale of the conjugal properties, including the family home, and the equal division of the proceeds. This 1999 resolution became final and executory. Petitioner’s subsequent attempts to challenge it via certiorari in the Court of Appeals and a petition to the Supreme Court were unsuccessful.
Years later, in 2003, petitioner filed a motion in the trial court seeking to forfeit private respondent’s share in the conjugal profits in favor of their children and to adjudicate the family home to him, citing provisions of the Family Code. The trial court denied this motion in August 2004, ruling it had lost jurisdiction as its 1999 decision was final. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration of this denial, petitioner directly filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari for petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the trial court and for lack of merit.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on two primary grounds. First, petitioner failed to observe the hierarchy of remedies by filing a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s August 2004 Order. A motion for reconsideration is a mandatory precondition, as it affords the lower court an opportunity to correct its own alleged error. Petitioner’s claim that doing so would be futile was unsubstantiated and did not justify bypassing the rule.
Second, and more fundamentally, the petition lacked substantive merit. The core relief sought—forfeiture of share and adjudication of the family home—effectively sought to modify the trial court’s 1999 resolution on property division. That resolution had long become final and executory. The doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment dictates that a final judgment can no longer be altered, amended, or modified, even to correct perceived errors of fact or law. This doctrine is grounded on public policy and the need for judicial stability. The trial court correctly held it had lost jurisdiction to entertain a motion that would reopen and substantially alter a final decree. Petitioner’s proper, but separate, recourse would have been to file a new civil action for forfeiture, not a collateral attack on a final judgment.