G.R. No. 156339; October 6, 2004
Violeta Yasoña, et al. vs. Rodencio and Jovencio de Ramos

FACTS

In 1971, Aurea Yasoña and her son sought financial help from her nephew, Jovencio de Ramos, to prevent the foreclosure of their property by PNB. They agreed that Jovencio would pay the loan in exchange for the sale to him of one-half of the property. Jovencio paid the loan on December 29, 1971, and Aurea executed a notarized deed of absolute sale for a 123-square-meter portion. The lot was subsequently subdivided, and separate titles were issued to Aurea and Jovencio in 1973. Jovencio paid realty taxes thereon, and Aurea later mortgaged only her remaining portion in separate loan transactions.
Twenty-two years later, in 1993, Aurea filed an estafa complaint against Jovencio and his brother Rodencio, alleging she was deceived into signing a blank paper that was later used as a deed of sale. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence. Consequently, the de Ramos brothers filed a civil case for damages based on malicious prosecution.

ISSUE

Whether the filing of the estafa complaint by petitioners against respondents constituted malicious prosecution.

RULING

Yes, the petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding that the essential elements of malice and absence of probable cause were present. Malicious prosecution requires that a legal proceeding was instituted maliciously and without probable cause, and that it terminated in favor of the defendant.
The Court found no probable cause for the estafa charge. The 1971 sale was evidenced by a duly notarized and registered deed, followed by the issuance of separate titles and Jovencio’s consistent payment of realty taxes. Aurea’s subsequent conduct—mortgaging only her portion in 1973 and 1979, and even requesting Jovencio to use his title as a bond in 1974—demonstrated her long-standing acknowledgment of Jovencio’s ownership. The 22-year delay in questioning the sale further undermined the good faith of the criminal complaint. The prosecutor’s dismissal for lack of evidence confirmed the absence of a factual or legal basis for the charge.
The petitioners’ intent was deemed malicious. Their awareness of Jovencio’s valid ownership, established by incontrovertible documentary evidence and their own prior acts, indicated a sinister design to vex the respondents. The Court distinguished this case from Drilon v. Court of Appeals, where probable cause existed. Here, the complete lack of probable cause, coupled with the petitioners’ knowledge of the sale’s validity, established liability. Thus, the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs was upheld.