G.R. No. 154363. September 13, 2005
JOEL P. LIBUIT, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Joel Libuit was convicted of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution established that in May 1993, private complainant Domingo del Mundo delivered his car for repair to Paeng Motorworks, operated by Libuit. The car was received by mechanic Jose Bautista in Libuit’s presence, with Libuit assuring del Mundo of its safety. In January 1994, del Mundo found his car by the roadside with its engine removed. Libuit and Bautista promised delivery after two weeks but failed. Upon del Mundo’s return, the car was missing. Police investigation revealed Libuit had sold car parts.
During trial, Libuit’s original counsel withdrew after his initial cross-examination. The court granted a resetting for him to secure new counsel. His new counsel, Atty. Jose Dimayuga, subsequently failed to appear at two scheduled hearings despite notice. Consequently, the trial court ordered the striking of Libuit’s direct testimony from the record and submitted the case for decision based on the prosecution’s evidence.

ISSUE

The issues are: (1) whether the prosecution proved the element of entrustment for estafa; (2) whether a formal demand was necessary; and (3) whether the trial court deprived Libuit of his right to counsel by striking his testimony.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the conviction. On the first issue, the Court ruled that entrustment was sufficiently proven. While the mechanic physically received the car, Libuit, as the shop operator present during delivery, assumed the obligation to repair and return it. His subsequent actions, including selling parts and failing to return the vehicle, constituted misappropriation and conversion, completing the elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b).
Regarding the second issue, the Court held that a formal demand is not always indispensable for estafa. The evidence showed repeated follow-ups by del Mundo, which constituted a demand sufficient to establish the accused’s refusal to return the property. His failure to comply despite these follow-ups confirmed the breach of trust.
On the third issue, the Court found no deprivation of the right to counsel. Libuit was initially represented by counsel de parte. After his counsel withdrew, the court accommodated his request for time to hire a new lawyer. The striking of his testimony was a proper consequence of his new counsel’s unjustified repeated absences, which the court could interpret as a tactic to delay proceedings. The trial court acted within its discretion, and its liberality in granting earlier postponements negated any claim of grave abuse.