G.R. No. 149627 , September 18, 2003
KENNETH O. NADELA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CITY OF CEBU AND METRO CEBU DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioner Kenneth O. Nadela filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession of an unregistered parcel of land in Barangay Inayawan, Cebu City, with damages. He alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, adverse, peaceful, and continuous possession in the concept of owner for over thirty years. He claimed that respondents, the City of Cebu and the Metro Cebu Development Project (MCDP), without his consent, dumped garbage and filling materials on the property, conducted earthworks, stationed security guards to prevent his entry, and blocked the approval of the property’s survey plan. He sought a writ of preliminary injunction and a declaration of ownership.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint. The City of Cebu argued the suit was against the state without its consent and that the action was premature. The MCDP, represented by the Solicitor General, contended the land was public land belonging to the state, the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and the suit was barred by state immunity. The Regional Trial Court initially granted a writ of injunction but later set it aside, citing Presidential Decree No. 1818 which prohibits injunctions against infrastructure projects. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The legal logic centered on the application of Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 , the Public Land Act, as amended. For a claimant to acquire imperfect title to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, possession must have commenced on or before June 12, 1945. The Court examined the allegations and evidence, particularly from the hearing on the preliminary injunction. Petitioner’s own opposition stated his predecessor’s possession commenced only in 1962, and the earliest tax declaration submitted was from 1962. These facts, deemed hypothetically admitted in a motion to dismiss, conclusively showed that the required possession did not meet the June 12, 1945 threshold. Consequently, the land remained public land, and the petitioner had no vested right of ownership that could be enforced against the state or its agents. The complaint therefore failed to allege a cause of action, as the facts pleaded did not entitle the petitioner to the judicial relief sought for recovery of ownership. The dismissal was proper.