GR 141917; (February, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 141917 . February 7, 2007.
BERNARDINO S. ZAMORA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA MERCADO ZAMORA, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Bernardino S. Zamora and respondent Norma Mercado Zamora were married in 1970. In 1972, Norma left to work as a nurse in the United States, returning only for periodic visits until 1989, when she became a U.S. citizen. Bernardino filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging Norma’s psychological incapacity. He claimed this was evidenced by her refusal to bear children, her abandonment through prolonged residence abroad, and their cohabitation of less than three years total.
Norma countered that she did not refuse to have children, noting her profession as a nurse and her care for her husband’s nieces and nephews. She attributed the marital breakdown to Bernardino’s infidelity, alleging he had affairs and fathered children with other women. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding no evidence of psychological incapacity and noting Bernardino’s infidelity as a contributing factor to the estrangement.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. The legal logic is anchored on the strict interpretation of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as elucidated in Santos v. Court of Appeals and Republic v. Molina. Psychological incapacity must be a grave, serious, and incurable psychological condition that renders a spouse completely unable to fulfill the essential marital obligations. It is not mere refusal, neglect, difficulty, or ill will.
The petitioner’s allegations—the respondent’s refusal to bear children, her living abroad, and their estrangement—do not constitute psychological incapacity. These are at best evidence of marital neglect, irreconcilable differences, or refusal to perform duties, which are legal grounds for separation but not for nullity. Crucially, the petitioner failed to prove that these behaviors stemmed from a psychological illness existing at the time of the marriage. The Court emphasized that the presentation of expert testimony, such as from a psychologist or psychiatrist, while not always mandatory, is desirable to establish the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the alleged psychological condition. The petitioner’s failure to provide such expert evidence, coupled with the absence of any clinical or diagnostic proof of a psychological disorder, was fatal to his case. The decision underscores that nullity under Article 36 is reserved for the most serious cases of personality disorders, not for the common failures of a marriage.
