GR 132659; (February, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 132659; February 12, 2007
CONRADO MAGBANUA and ROSEMARIE MAGBANUA-TABORADA, the latter assisted by her husband ARTEMIO TABORADA, Petitioners, vs. PILAR S. JUNSAY, assisted by her husband VICENTE JUNSAY, IBARRA LOPEZ, and JUANITO JACELA, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Rosemarie Magbanua, a housemaid, was charged with Robbery in 1982 by her employer, respondent Pilar Junsay, based on an alleged confession. Rosemarie was acquitted in 1985 after the trial court found her confession was extracted under duress through physical maltreatment by police officers, and the prosecution’s other evidence was insufficient and discredited. The court noted the improbability that investigators would have failed to search her belongings if they truly suspected her.
In 1987, Rosemarie and her father, Conrado Magbanua, filed a Complaint for Damages for malicious prosecution against respondent Junsay and the involved police officers. They alleged the criminal case caused them shame, humiliation, mental anguish, and financial loss. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, prompting this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners have a valid cause of action for damages based on malicious prosecution against the respondents.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal. For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove that the prosecution was prompted by malice, initiated without probable cause, and terminated in the plaintiff’s acquittal. While Rosemarie was acquitted, the element of malice was not established.
The legal logic is that acquittal alone does not equate to malicious prosecution. The respondents had probable cause to file the charge. Respondent Junsay acted on Rosemarie’s own alleged confession and the discovery of a stolen necklace in her room. The police officers acted on a sworn complaint. The absence of probable cause is a prerequisite for finding malice. Here, the prosecution was based on a reasonable belief of Rosemarie’s guilt derived from the circumstances known to the respondents at the time. The subsequent judicial finding that the confession was coerced and the evidence weak does not retroactively render the initial filing malicious. The respondents were not shown to have acted with a sinister design to vex or humiliate, but rather from a desire to prosecute a perceived crime. Therefore, the essential elements for a damages claim under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code were not satisfied.