G.R. No. 116938 ; September 20, 2001
LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner, vs. REMEDIOS A. AMOR, RAUL R. ARNAU, ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., FRANCISCO A. VILLA, all of the Office of the Ombudsman, and LEONCIA R. DIMAGIBA, Assistant City Prosecutor, Manila, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda’s husband died following a surgical procedure. The National Bureau of Investigation’s autopsy report recommended the filing of criminal charges for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide against both the surgeon, Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr., and the anesthesiologist, Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes. After preliminary investigation, respondent Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Dr. Reyes and filed an information only against Dr. Antonio. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Prosecutor Dimagiba for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and for grave misconduct, alleging manifest partiality and evident bad faith in dismissing the charge against Dr. Reyes. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence, a resolution subsequently approved by the respondent Ombudsman officials. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint against Assistant City Prosecutor Dimagiba for violation of R.A. No. 3019 , Section 3(e).

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The Court clarified that the Ombudsman is not the proper forum to review alleged errors in a prosecutor’s appreciation of evidence, as such review intrinsically belongs to the Secretary of Justice under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. More critically, the Court held that the essential elements for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were not established. For liability to attach, the act of the public officer must cause undue injury to any party by giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court found that the prosecutor’s act of dismissing the charge against one of the doctors, even if potentially an error in judgment, did not by itself constitute evident bad faith or gross negligence absent clear proof of a corrupt motive. Mere error in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, without more, does not amount to a violation of the Anti-Graft Law. Since petitioner failed to substantiate that the dismissal was attended by manifest partiality or bad faith causing specific, quantified undue injury, the Ombudsman correctly dismissed the complaint.