GR 154920; (August, 2003) (Digest)
G.R. No. 154920 ; August 15, 2003
Rodney Hegerty, Petitioner, vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Allan Nash, Respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Allan Nash filed a complaint for estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Rodney Hegerty before the City Prosecutor of Manila. Nash alleged that Hegerty, along with two others, invited him to invest in a foreign exchange scheme. From 1992 to 1997, Nash invested over US$236,000. In December 1997, Hegerty informed Nash that the investments were lost after being lent to a company where Hegerty was a stockholder. Hegerty denied the allegations, stating he never invited Nash to invest and had no involvement with the presented receipts.
The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Nash’s counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Nash himself received a copy of the denial on May 8, 2000. He filed an appeal with the Department of Justice (DOJ) on May 19, 2000. The DOJ dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time and also denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Nash then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which granted the petition, reversed the DOJ resolutions, and directed the prosecution of Hegerty for estafa.
ISSUE
1. Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the case given that Nash’s appeal to the DOJ was filed out of time?
2. Could the Court of Appeals, acting without jurisdiction, order the prosecution of the criminal case?
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner Hegerty, reversing the Court of Appeals. On the jurisdictional issue, the Court held that the reglementary period to appeal the prosecutor’s resolution to the DOJ is fifteen days from receipt. Nash’s counsel received the initial dismissal on June 16, 1999, and filed a motion for reconsideration, which tolled the period. When Nash himself received the denial on May 8, 2000, only the remaining five days of the period continued to run, making the last day to appeal May 15, 2000. His appeal filed on May 19, 2000 was indisputably late. Service of the resolution directly to Nash was valid under DOJ rules, which permit service upon either the party or his counsel. Consequently, the prosecutor’s resolution became final, and the DOJ correctly dismissed the untimely appeal. The Court of Appeals thus lacked jurisdiction to entertain Nash’s petition.
On the substantive issue, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the City Prosecutor. The prosecutor’s finding of insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for estafa—noting a lack of proof that Hegerty received Nash’s money or had a partnership with the other individuals—was a proper exercise of investigatory discretion. Absent a showing that this discretion was exercised in a capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner, the Court cannot interfere via certiorari. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering Hegerty’s prosecution.
