GR 193065; (February, 2012) (Digest)
G.R. No. 193065; February 27, 2012
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS
Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SteelCorp) underwent corporate rehabilitation. During the proceedings, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) assigned its credit to Deutsche Bank AG. The rehabilitation court, upon SteelCorp’s motion, issued an Order dated October 28, 2009, directing assignees like Deutsche Bank to disclose the actual price paid for the assigned debts. Deutsche Bank challenged this order via a Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 111556) before the Court of Appeals.
Simultaneously, a separate petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 107535) filed by Vitarich Corporation was pending before a different CA Division. The Vitarich case, arising from its own rehabilitation, involved a similar legal question: whether a debtor in rehabilitation can compel assignee-creditors to disclose the assignment price. SteelCorp moved to consolidate Deutsche Bank’s petition with the earlier-filed Vitarich petition, arguing they involved a common question of law. The CA granted the motion for consolidation.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the consolidation of Deutsche Bank’s certiorari petition with the Vitarich petition.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion. Consolidation is governed by Section 3, Rule III of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, which permits it only when cases involve the same parties and related causes of action or issues. The Supreme Court found no identity of parties between the two petitions. Deutsche Bank’s petition involved SteelCorp’s rehabilitation in Batangas, while the Vitarich petition concerned a separate corporate rehabilitation in Bulacan. The parties and the underlying rehabilitation proceedings were distinct and unrelated.
Furthermore, while the legal issue appeared similar superficially, the factual and procedural contexts were materially different. The specific rehabilitation plans, the orders issued by the different trial courts, and the stages of the proceedings were not the same. Consolidation is not justified by a mere common question of law when the actions arise from different factual milieus and involve different parties. The CA’s order to consolidate was therefore issued with grave abuse of discretion, as it was contrary to the rules and jurisprudence on consolidation. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the CA’s resolutions ordering consolidation.