G.R. No. 125154; September 28, 2001
DIGNA VERGEL, EDUARDO SALVACRUZ, BEATRIZ MANACOP, FELICISIMA FLORES, GENEROSO SALVACRUZ, BLANDINO SALVACRUZ, MILAGROS SALVACRUZ and THE HEIRS OF CORAZON SANTIAGO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DOROTEA TAMISIN GONZALES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners filed an application for land registration over a parcel of land in Laguna. The Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition. The trial court subsequently issued an order of general default against the whole world except the Republic. Respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales later filed an urgent motion to set aside this order of general default, claiming ownership over the same land. She alleged she learned of the application only by accident and that petitioners filed it in bad faith without personal notice to her. The trial court denied her motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court annulled the trial court’s orders and set aside the order of general default with respect to respondent. It did so based on its view that substantial justice and a speedy determination of the controversy would be better served by allowing her to oppose the application and establish her claim, without making a specific finding of fraud, accident, or excusable neglect.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court’s order of general default without a specific finding of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petitioners’ appeal and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. The legal logic is anchored on the procedural requirements for lifting an order of default. An order of general default in a land registration case, issued after due publication and notice, is not to be set aside lightly. For a court to lift such an order, there must be a factual finding of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented the filing of a timely opposition. The Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily by setting aside the default order based merely on its own perception of substantial justice, without establishing the requisite factual basis. Respondent’s claim of missing the publication or learning of the case by accident, in itself, does not automatically constitute excusable negligence warranting relief from the order. Since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, it remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to make the necessary factual determinations on whether such grounds exist to justify lifting the order of default.