AM P 11 2926; (February, 2012) (Digest)
A.M. No. P-11-2926; February 1, 2012
JUDGE LUCINA ALPEZ DAYAON, Complainant, vs. JESUSA V. DE LEON, Respondent.
FACTS
Presiding Judge Lucina Alpez Dayaon filed an administrative complaint against her Court Stenographer III, Jesusa V. De Leon, for habitual absenteeism. The complaint detailed that De Leon incurred unauthorized absences for prolonged periods in 2010, specifically from April 22 to 30, May 4 to 14, May 24 to 31, and June 1 to 25. Judge Dayaon also cited a history of similar infractions, referencing memoranda issued to De Leon in 2008 for absenteeism and failure to transcribe notes, and a 2009 record where her absences and tardiness exceeded her attendance. Despite a directive to explain, De Leon initially failed to respond.
In her Comment, De Leon admitted to the absences but cited mitigating family circumstances. She explained that her three children were ill, her husband was unemployed, and financial hardship prevented formal medical care and even filing for leave. She asserted that she resumed regular work by late June 2010, had only three pending transcriptions, and pleaded for leniency given her 18 years of service and role as sole breadwinner.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Jesusa V. De Leon is administratively liable for Habitual Absenteeism, and if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
RULING
Yes, respondent is guilty of Habitual Absenteeism. Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 defines habitual absenteeism as incurring unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit for at least three consecutive months in a year. De Leon’s admitted and certified absences of 7 days in April, 14 days in May, and 18 days in June 2010 clearly violate this rule. Her reasons, while compelling on a human level, are insufficient to exonerate her from administrative liability, as public service demands strict adherence to attendance rules.
On the penalty, the Court adopted the OCA’s mitigated recommendation. The prescribed penalty for a first offense is suspension for six months and one day to one year. However, the Court consistently considers mitigating factors. Here, De Leon’s 18-year service, acknowledgment of her infraction, expression of remorse, and dire family circumstances warranted leniency. The Court cited the principle that where a lesser penalty suffices, it should be imposed to consider the welfare of the employee and her dependents. Nevertheless, further mitigation was unjustified due to her prior infractions in 2008 and 2009. Balancing these factors, the Court suspended De Leon for ONE MONTH without pay, with a stern warning against repetition.
