G.R. No. 214864, March 22, 2017
Philippine Ports Authority vs. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc.

FACTS

The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) awarded a ten-year cargo-handling contract to Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. (NIASSI) following a public bidding. NIASSI conformed to the Notice of Award. However, instead of executing a formal written contract, PPA issued a series of Hold-Over Authorities (HOAs) allowing NIASSI to operate provisionally. PPA later revoked the HOA and took over operations. NIASSI filed a petition for mandamus to compel PPA to execute the formal contract, with an ancillary prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI). The Court of Appeals, in a prior certiorari proceeding (CA-G.R. SP No. 00214), reinstated the WPMI, finding that a perfected contract existed, giving NIASSI a clear legal right to operate. This Court affirmed that decision in G.R. No. 174136.
Upon remand, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially dismissed the main mandamus case as moot, citing the CA’s prior finding of a perfected contract. On reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself, a decision affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 04828-MIN, which held the HOA was a separate agreement and ordered PPA to execute the formal ten-year contract. PPA assailed this ruling.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04828-MIN erred in ordering PPA to execute a formal ten-year cargo-handling contract with NIASSI.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the CA. The ponencia applied the law of the case doctrine, holding the CA’s prior finding in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214—that a contract was perfected—was binding and rendered the mandamus action moot. It also noted the ten-year term had expired. Justice Perlas-Bernabe, in a separate concurrence, agreed with the result but disagreed with applying the law of the case doctrine. She reasoned that the prior CA finding was made only for the limited purpose of determining entitlement to a WPMI, not as a final adjudication on the existence of a formal, executory contract required for mandamus. However, she concurred in the dismissal on the independent ground of mootness. She concluded that NIASSI had already operated the port for over twelve years through the HOAs and the injunction period, which exceeded the contracted ten-year term. Therefore, the contract had expired, and compelling its execution served no practical legal purpose. The core issue was rendered moot and academic.