GR 81909; (September, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 81909 September 5, 1991
LETICIA C. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CONRADO VASQUEZ, JR., FROILAN E. ISORENA AND LAURO E. ISORENA, respondents.
FACTS
Spouses Pedro Isorena and Matilde Echavarria owned a parcel of land mortgaged to a bank. To save it from foreclosure, Pedro gave his son Froilan the amount to pay the bank. However, Froilan, his wife, and his mother Matilde were made to execute a promissory note and a real estate mortgage over the same property in favor of Leticia C. Mendoza, Pedro’s common-law wife. Upon default, Mendoza extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, consolidated ownership, and obtained title. After prevailing in an unlawful detainer case against Froilan for non-payment of rentals, Mendoza was sued by Froilan and his siblings in 1986. Their complaint sought the annulment of the mortgage, auction sale, Mendoza’s title, and the unlawful detainer decision, alleging the loan was actually their father’s money and the documents were executed under psychological pressure.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Mendoza’s petition for certiorari and mandamus, which sought to compel the trial court to grant her motion to dismiss the annulment complaint.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied Mendoza’s petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The trial court correctly deferred resolution of the motion to dismiss, as the grounds raised were not indubitable. First, the action had not clearly prescribed; the complaint alleged vitiated consent, which could affect the reckoning of the prescriptive period. Second, res judicata did not apply. The final judgment in the unlawful detainer case was conclusive only on the issue of possession, not ownership, and could not bar a separate action for annulment of documents under Rule 70, Section 7 of the Rules of Court. Third, the private respondents, as legitimate heirs of the original owners, had the personality to prosecute the action to recover the property. Finally, the allegation of estoppel required a full trial to determine the circumstances surrounding the mortgage’s execution, including claims of psychological fear. The appellate court committed no grave abuse of discretion, as the grounds for dismissal involved factual matters needing a trial for proper adjudication.