G.R. No. L-39120 November 21, 1991
APOLONIO MADRONA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Southern Leyte, and PANFILO NOMBRADO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Apolonio Madrona, Sr. filed a civil action for damages against private respondent Panfilo Nombrado before the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Southern Leyte. The complaint alleged that on July 9, 1973, at the PC Headquarters in Maasin, Nombrado publicly uttered slanderous remarks against Madrona in the Visayan dialect, calling him a “braggart,” “devil,” “animal,” and stating he was “just a parasite to the families of the Bernades and Ligtas.” Madrona claimed these statements caused him humiliation, emotional distress, and besmirched reputation, for which he sought moral damages and attorney’s fees, filing the action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action. He argued the words used were common expressions of disgust not intended to cause dishonor, and that “mingsagbay” meant “attached” rather than “parasite.” He also revealed a prior criminal complaint for slander had been dismissed by the fiscal. Without stating any reason, respondent Judge Avelino Rosal issued an order granting the motion to dismiss without prejudice. Madrona’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the challenged orders. The Court held that a complaint states a cause of action if it alleges a legal right of the plaintiff, a correlative obligation of the defendant, and an act or omission violating that right. At the stage of a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted, and the test is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer.
The complaint sufficiently alleged all elements of a cause of action for damages arising from defamation. It asserted Madrona’s right to reputation, Nombrado’s duty not to utter defamatory words, the actual utterance of the statements in a public setting, and the resulting injury. The determination of whether the words are indeed defamatory is a matter of evidence to be presented during trial, not a proper ground for dismissal. Words are to be construed in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as understood by the ordinary listener. The respondent Judge’s failure to provide any justification for the dismissal compounded the error and constituted a grave abuse of discretion. The case was remanded for further proceedings.