GR 100228; (July, 1994) (Digest)
G.R. No. 100228 July 13, 1994
PAZ DE JESUS MESINA and PETER DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CETUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondents.
FACTS
The case involves a parcel of land in Quiapo, Manila, originally owned by Gregorio Araneta and verbally leased to Clemente de Jesus in the late 1800s. Upon Clemente’s death, his successors, petitioners Paz Mesina and Peter de Jesus, continued possession. The land was eventually sold to respondent Cetus Development Corporation (CETUS). In 1986, CETUS filed an ejectment case solely against Paz Mesina, alleging unlawful subleasing without owner consent under Batas Pambansa Blg. 877. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the complaint, a decision affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which became final. In 1989, CETUS filed a new ejectment complaint, this time impleading both Paz and Peter, based on a new demand letter dated July 12, 1989, alleging subleasing after November 18, 1985. The MeTC ordered petitioners to vacate. The RTC reversed, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the MeTC’s ejectment order.
ISSUE
Whether the principle of res judicata bars the second ejectment case.
RULING
No, res judicata does not apply. For res judicata to bar a subsequent action, there must be, among other requisites, identity of parties and identity of causes of action between the first and second cases. While there is identity concerning Paz Mesina, there is no identity of parties with respect to Peter de Jesus, who was not impleaded in the first case and thus not bound by its judgment. More critically, there is no identity of causes of action. The first case was based on a demand letter dated November 18, 1985, concerning subleasing prior to that date. The second case is based on a new demand letter dated July 12, 1989, concerning subleasing after November 18, 1985, and before July 12, 1989. The verbal lease was a month-to-month contract, where each thirty-day period constitutes a separate and distinct lease. A cause of action based on violations in one period is separate from a cause of action based on violations in another. Therefore, the finality of the first case only adjudicated the issue of subleasing prior to November 18, 1985, and does not preclude an action for subsequent violations. The petition was dismissed.