GR 102007; (September, 1994) (Digest)

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was convicted of Rape by the Regional Trial Court. While his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital. Consequently, the Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. The Solicitor General was required to comment on the subsisting civil liability. The Solicitor General argued that the civil liability survived the accused’s death, citing People v. Sendaydiego, and urged the Court to resolve the appeal to review the conviction underpinning the civil liability. Conversely, the defense counsel contended that death pending appeal extinguishes both criminal and civil liability, invoking the Court of Appeals ruling in People v. Castillo.

ISSUE

Does the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability arising from the crime?

RULING

Yes, the civil liability arising exclusively from the crime is extinguished. The Court, resolving the conflict between Sendaydiego and Castillo, affirmed the doctrine in Castillo. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is extinguished by death, and pecuniary penalties are extinguished if death occurs before final judgment. The term “final judgment” in Article 89 means a judgment that is final and executory, beyond recall. Since the accused died while his conviction was on appeal, the judgment had not attained finality. Consequently, his criminal liability was totally extinguished.
The civil liability in this case is one based exclusively on the crime or delict. Such civil liability is extinguished together with the criminal liability because it is deemed not to have been established by a final, executory judgment declaring the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, and no separate civil action was reserved. Therefore, with the extinction of the criminal liability due to death pending appeal, the civil liability rooted solely in the delict is likewise extinguished. The Court clarified that this rule does not apply if the civil liability proceeds from a source of obligation independent of the crime, such as law, contract, quasi-contract, or quasi-delict, which may be pursued in a separate civil action against the estate.