G.R. No. 195248 November 22, 2017
JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CRISTINA YAO, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner John Dennis G. Chua was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of four counts of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22). The prosecution established that respondent Cristina Yao extended loans to petitioner, who issued four checks as payment. These checks were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Yao made a demand by personally delivering a letter to petitioner’s office, received by his secretary. After petitioner pleaded not guilty, trial proceeded before several judges due to reassignments and the death of one judge. The case was eventually submitted for decision. Judge Marianito C. Santos, who had presided over the hearings as a pairing judge, rendered the guilty verdict on April 15, 2009, after Judge Mary George T. Cajandab-Caldona had already been appointed as the new acting presiding judge of the branch.
Petitioner challenged the conviction via a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), arguing that Judge Santos lacked authority to promulgate the decision once a permanent judge had been appointed. The RTC denied the petition, upholding Judge Santos’s authority under Supreme Court Circular No. 19-98, which allows a pairing judge to decide cases heard and submitted during their tenure. Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the MeTC decision promulgated by a pairing judge after the appointment of a new presiding judge is valid. Subsidiarily, the Court addressed whether the prosecution proved all elements of B.P. 22 beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and acquitted petitioner. On the procedural issue, the Court clarified that under Supreme Court Circular No. 5-98, a pairing or assisting judge retains authority to decide cases that were heard and submitted for decision during their incumbency, even after a new presiding judge assumes office. Therefore, Judge Santos validly decided the case, as he presided over the trial and the case was submitted before Judge Caldona’s appointment. The RTC correctly upheld his authority.
However, the Court reversed the conviction on substantive grounds. For a B.P. 22 conviction, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the time of check issuance. This knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the check, but the presumption is disputable. Crucially, the law requires that a notice of dishonor be sent to the drawer, and the drawer fails to pay within five days from receipt. Here, the prosecution only proved that the demand letter was received by petitioner’s secretary. There was no evidence that the notice of dishonor from the bank was actually sent to and received by petitioner himself. The mere receipt of a demand letter by a secretary is insufficient to prove receipt of the statutory notice of dishonor required to give rise to the presumption of knowledge. Consequently, an essential element of the offense was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, warranting acquittal. Nonetheless, petitioner’s civil liability for the loan remains, and he was ordered to pay the face value of the checks with legal interest.