G.R. No. 229420 . February 19, 2018.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ROGER DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS, RAYMOND DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS, JAYSON MIRANDA Y NACPIL, ROLANDO TALBAN Y MENDOZA, AND JOEL JACINTO Y CELESTINO, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Respondents were charged with Carnapping with Homicide for the 2011 abduction and killing of Venson Evangelista. Co-accused Alfred Mendiola voluntarily surrendered and implicated the Dominguez brothers as masterminds. The prosecution moved to discharge Mendiola as a state witness. During the hearing on this motion on June 27, 2011, Mendiola testified and was cross-examined, but defense counsel explicitly limited his cross-examination to matters pertinent to the discharge and reserved the right to a more extensive cross-examination during the trial proper. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the discharge on September 29, 2011, ordering that Mendiola’s testimonies from the discharge proceedings “form part of the trial of this case.” However, Mendiola died on May 6, 2012, before he could testify during the trial proper.

ISSUE

Whether the testimony given by Mendiola during the hearing on the motion for his discharge as a state witness is admissible as part of the prosecution’s evidence-in-chief despite his subsequent death and the defense’s reserved right to further cross-examination.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the Court of Appeals, which upheld the RTC’s order to strike Mendiola’s testimony from the record. The Court held that the testimony was inadmissible. The constitutional right of the accused to confront witnesses face-to-face includes the right to cross-examination, which is essential for testing the witness’s credibility and the truth of their testimony. While the right to cross-examine may be forfeited by the accused’s own fault, here, the defense’s reservation of the right to a fuller cross-examination during the trial proper was valid and reasonable because the scope of the initial hearing was confined solely to determining the propriety of Mendiola’s discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The purpose of that hearing was distinct from the trial on the merits. Consequently, Mendiola’s death before the trial proper permanently deprived the accused of their right to complete cross-examination. The RTC’s initial order that the testimony would form part of the trial was conditional upon Mendiola fulfilling his duty to testify subsequently. His failure to do so due to his death rendered his prior uncross-examined testimony inadmissible as evidence-in-chief against the accused.