G.R. No. 142974 , September 22, 2003
Spouses Shem G. Alfarero and Aurelia Tagalog, Spouses Gines G. Alfarero and Noni Cruspero and Naomi G. Alfarero, Petitioners, vs. Spouses Petra and Sancho Sevilla, Respondents.

FACTS

Respondents, the Spouses Sevilla, were the original homestead patentees of a parcel of land. On May 25, 1986, they executed a notarized Deed of Sale conveying a one-hectare portion to the petitioners, the Alfareros, for P12,000. The corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the Alfareros’ names, inscribed with the condition that it was “Subject to the rights of repurchase by the Original Patentee or his heirs within a period of five (5) years from the date of the conveyance pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended.” In January 1991, the Sevillas filed an action to repurchase the property.
The Alfareros resisted, contending the right had prescribed. They presented an unnotarized Deed of Sale indicating the sale was executed in December 1985, arguing the five-year repurchase period should be counted from that earlier date. The trial court granted the Sevillas’ action for reconveyance, ruling the repurchase was timely. The Court of Appeals affirmed, giving greater evidentiary weight to the notarized deed dated May 25, 1986.

ISSUE

The primary issue is what constitutes the “date of the conveyance” under Section 119 of the Public Land Act for computing the five-year repurchase period: the date of execution as stated in the notarized deed or an earlier, unspecified date in an unnotarized document.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court’s decision. On the main issue, the Court held that the “date of the conveyance” for purposes of the repurchase period under Section 119 of CA 141 refers to the date of the execution of the conveyance document, not the date of its notarization or registration. However, in determining that date, a notarized document is entitled to a presumption of regularity and carries greater evidentiary weight than a private, unnotarized one.
The Alfareros’ claim of a December 1985 sale was based on an unnotarized deed with an incomplete date (“__th day of December 1985”). In contrast, the Sevillas’ notarized deed clearly stated the date of execution as May 25, 1986. Between the two, the public document prevails. Counting the five-year period from May 25, 1986, the complaint filed on January 3, 1991, was well within the prescriptive period. The Court also found no merit in the ancillary issue regarding a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, as such a motion is not a proper remedy during appeal and the evidence could have been discovered earlier with due diligence.