GR 121428; (November, 1995) (Digest)
G.R. No. 121428 November 29, 1995
EX-BATAAN VETERANS SECURITY AGENCY, INC. AND/OR LEONARDO CASTRO, JR., petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. GEOBEL A. BARTOLABAC, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents, security guards, filed complaints for illegal dismissal against petitioners. Labor Arbiter Cresencio J. Ramos, in a July 31, 1992 decision, ordered their reinstatement with three years of backwages and attorneyโs fees. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed the decision. While the appeal was pending, a writ of execution for reinstatement was issued. The sheriffโs return indicated the guards were reinstated as of October 12, 1992. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 110984), which was dismissed on February 21, 1994, rendering the 1992 Labor Arbiter decision final and executory. The monetary awards were fully satisfied.
Subsequently, the guards filed a motion alleging they were not actually allowed to work after the purported reinstatement. They sought payment of withheld wages and, alternatively, separation pay. Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac, in an October 27, 1994 order, granted separation pay and additional wages, finding reinstatement was no longer viable due to a strained relationship. Petitioners challenged this order, arguing it improperly amended the final 1992 judgment.
ISSUE
Whether a Labor Arbiter, via a subsequent order, can award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement when the final and executory decision only ordered reinstatement with backwages and did not award separation pay.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court granted the petition and annulled the award of separation pay. The legal logic is anchored on the principle of immutability of final judgments and the limited scope of a writ of execution. A decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable. The dispositive portion of the July 31, 1992 decision explicitly ordered reinstatement and awarded specific monetary benefits; it did not grant separation pay. A writ of execution must conform strictly to the essential particulars of the judgment decreed; it cannot vary or expand the terms of the final judgment. Therefore, the subsequent order by Labor Arbiter Bartolabac, which effectively modified the final judgment by substituting reinstatement with separation pay, constituted a void execution. The Court noted that the failure to actually resume work was attributable to the guardsโ own fault for not providing their own uniforms, as required by regulations, and not due to the employerโs refusal. Consequently, the award of separation pay, being an ultra vires modification of a final judgment, was null and void.
