GR 169082; (August, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 169082 ; August 17, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ERNESTO DE GUZMAN Y ELEMENCIO, Appellant.
FACTS
Appellant Ernesto de Guzman was convicted of Murder for the killing of Felicito Rodrigo. The prosecution evidence established that on June 14, 1997, around 1:00 a.m., while appellant was conversing with the victim and others in Barangay San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, he suddenly stood up, uttered “Eto, gusto mo bang hiramin ito?” and immediately stabbed the unarmed victim. The victim fled, but appellant chased, caught up with him, and continued stabbing him. As the victim fell face down, appellant inflicted three more stab wounds to his back. The autopsy revealed multiple stab wounds, with one fatal wound to the chest that pierced the heart, liver, and lung.
Appellant interposed the defense of alibi, claiming he was sleeping at his mother’s house, approximately 15 meters from the crime scene, at the time of the incident. His mother corroborated this claim. Another defense witness, Cecilia Flores, testified she saw the victim arguing with prosecution witness Enrico Garcia around the time of the incident but did not witness the stabbing.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed appellant’s conviction for Murder, appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The defense of alibi was correctly rejected. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was elsewhere when the crime occurred but that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene. Appellant failed to meet this burden, as his mother’s house was merely 15 meters away, making his presence at the crime scene highly possible. His denial and claim of not knowing the prosecution witnesses, who were his long-time barangay mates, were self-serving and could not prevail over the positive and credible identification by eyewitnesses who were not shown to have any ill motive.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated. The legal essence of treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself and ensuring the execution of the crime without risk to the aggressor. The evidence clearly shows that while the group was engaged in a conversation, appellant, without any provocation, suddenly stood up and stabbed the unarmed victim. The attack was so swift and unexpected that the victim was deprived of any opportunity to retaliate or escape. This was compounded by appellant’s act of continuing to stab the victim even as he fled and after he had fallen defenseless to the ground. The suddenness of the initial assault and the continued attack on a fleeing and fallen victim clearly constituted treachery, qualifying the killing as Murder.
