GR 156470; (April, 2008) (Digest)
G.R. No. 156470 ; April 30, 2008
FREDERICK DAEL, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES BENEDICTO and VILMA BELTRAN, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Frederick Dael filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages against respondent-spouses. He alleged they sold him a parcel of land without disclosing it was under mortgage and subject to an extrajudicial foreclosure, forcing him to pay again at the foreclosure sale to secure the property. Respondents moved to dismiss, arguing Dael had no cause of action because the named vendee in the Contract to Sell was “Frederick George Ghent Dael,” not the petitioner. During a hearing, petitioner’s counsel disclosed that the petitioner is the father of the named vendee and requested time to address the discrepancy.
The trial court ordered petitioner to clarify the identity and status of the parties to the contract. Instead of complying, petitioner filed a Notice of Dismissal without prejudice under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting his right to dismiss before a responsive pleading was served. The trial court, however, granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruling petitioner lacked cause of action as he was not a contracting party.
ISSUE
Did the Regional Trial Court err in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based on respondents’ Motion to Dismiss instead of granting petitioner’s Notice of Dismissal without prejudice?
RULING
No, the trial court did not err. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice. While Rule 17, Section 1 grants a plaintiff a right to dismiss by notice before service of an answer or motion for summary judgment, this right is not absolute. The rule presupposes that the plaintiff is the real party-in-interest. Here, petitioner’s own judicial admission, through his counsel, revealed he was not the vendee named in the contract, which was the basis of his suit. This fundamental defect meant he was not the proper party to institute the action.
Consequently, the trial court correctly treated the case as one for dismissal due to lack of cause of action under Rule 16, not a voluntary dismissal under Rule 17. A dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, which goes to the merits of the claim, is a dismissal with prejudice under the doctrine of res judicata, as it bars the refiling of the same claim by the same party. The Court also held that the petition for review was proper as it raised pure questions of law regarding the application of procedural rules.