GR 244128 Perlas Bernabe (Digest)
G.R. No. 244128 , September 8, 2020
MARIO M. MADERA, BEVERLY C. MANANGUITE, CARISSA D. GALING, AND JOSEFINA O. PELO, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) AND COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VIII, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS
The case originated from a Notice of Disallowance (ND) issued by the Commission on Audit (COA) against certain allowances granted to officials and employees of the Office of the Vice Mayor of Tacloban City, which were found to be without legal basis. The petitioners, who were the approving officers and recipients of these disallowed benefits, sought relief from the COA’s directive for them to refund the amounts. The case reached the Supreme Court, which took the opportunity to reconcile conflicting jurisprudential guidelines on the liability for the return of disallowed amounts.
ISSUE
The central issue is the proper determination of the liability of approving officers and recipients to refund disallowed amounts, specifically clarifying the legal frameworks and standards of fault applicable.
RULING
The Court, through the main decision and concurring opinions, established unified parameters. Justice Perlas-Bernabe’s Separate Concurring Opinion provides a detailed legal foundation. From an administrative law perspective, liability for unlawful expenditures is personal under Section 52 of the Administrative Code and Section 103 of the Government Auditing Code. However, this liability is not automatic. For approving officers, Section 16.1.3 of COA Circular No. 2009-006 requires that liability attaches only if there is negligence or a failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. This is aligned with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which shields public officers from civil liability for official acts absent a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence.
From a civil law perspective, the obligation to return arises from solutio indebiti under the Civil Code, requiring receipt of something not due. For recipients, good faith is a key determinant. A recipient in good faith is liable only for the return of the amount they actually received. In contrast, a recipient in bad faith is liable for refund with interest. The concurring opinion harmonizes these frameworks, concluding that approving officers are not automatically solidarily liable with recipients. Their liability is contingent on a finding of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence in the performance of their duties. The guidelines affirm that the return of disallowed amounts is governed by these principles of accountability, fault, and unjust enrichment, ensuring fairness while upholding the constitutional mandate of public accountability.