GR 182065; (October, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 182065 ; October 27, 2009
EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA, Petitioners, vs. HON. MARIANO M. MALONES, both in his private and official capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioners are stallholders at the newly renovated Maasin Public Market. The Sangguniang Bayan approved Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, which increased stall rentals and imposed a “goodwill fee” of ₱20,000. The ordinance was enacted following a meeting on August 11, 1998, for which stallholders received notice only five days prior. The Sangguniang Bayan later passed Resolution No. 68 declaring the August 11 meeting inoperative as a public hearing due to opposition, but the Mayor vetoed this resolution. Subsequently, the Mayor informed petitioners they were illegally occupying stalls without a lease contract, prompting them to file a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, thereby upholding the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 and the Mayor’s actions.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The Court held that the petitioners improperly availed themselves of the special civil actions of mandamus and prohibition. Mandamus requires a clear legal right to the performance of a ministerial duty. Here, petitioners had no clear right to occupy the stalls without complying with the new ordinance, as occupancy is subject to the execution of a lease contract incorporating the revised fees. Prohibition does not lie because it is a remedy against judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions; the Mayor’s acts in implementing the ordinance and managing the municipal market were executive in nature.
On the substantive issue, the Court found the ordinance valid. The imposition of goodwill fees is a valid exercise of the municipality’s power to generate revenue under the Local Government Code. While a public hearing is required for tax ordinances, the Court noted that hearings were indeed conducted on August 11, 1998, and January 22, 1999. The technical defect of the short five-day notice for the first hearing was cured by the subsequent hearing, and the Sangguniang Bayan’s deliberations constituted substantial compliance with the requirement. The veto of Resolution No. 68 was a valid executive act, and the ordinance remained in full force. Consequently, the Mayor acted within his authority in requiring compliance with the new lease terms.