G.R. No. 129079 . December 2, 1998.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Department of Trade and Industry), petitioner, vs. HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Presiding Judge of RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch 20; and HELENA Z. BENITEZ, respondents.

FACTS

The Republic, through the Construction Manpower Development Foundation (CMDF), sought to acquire a portion of private respondent Helena Benitez’s land in Dasmariñas, Cavite, for a government development project. After negotiations for a sale failed, Benitez demanded that CMDF vacate the property and filed an unlawful detainer case. To prevent ejectment and secure the property for public use, the Republic instituted an expropriation complaint under Executive Order No. 1035.
Pursuant to EO 1035, the Republic deposited ten percent of the property’s provisional value with the Philippine National Bank and filed a motion for a writ of possession. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially granted the writ. However, upon Benitez’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC quashed the writ. The RTC reasoned that the writ was unnecessary since the government was already in possession, and that the pending ejectment suit presented a prejudicial question affecting the government’s right to possess the property.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the writ of possession issued in favor of the Republic pursuant to Executive Order No. 1035.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and annulled the assailed RTC orders. The Court held that under Section 7 of EO 1035, the issuance of a writ of possession to the government upon deposit of at least ten percent of the property’s provisional value is a ministerial duty of the court. This ministerial duty is not negated by the government’s prior physical possession, which in this case was derived from a lease agreement that had already expired.
The legal logic is clear: the purpose of the expropriation proceeding was precisely to authorize the government’s continued possession for a public purpose and to prevent its ejectment based on the terminated lease. The pending ejectment case does not constitute a prejudicial question that would bar the issuance of the writ. A prejudicial question must involve an issue so intimately related to the main action that its resolution determines whether the main action may proceed. The ejectment case, which concerns possession based on a private contract, is entirely separate from the expropriation case, which is an exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain for public use. Therefore, the respondent judge whimsically disregarded the clear mandate of EO 1035, constituting grave abuse of discretion. The writ of possession must be reinstated to secure the government’s possession for the public project pending the final determination of just compensation.